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The central theme of this thesis is that the wilderness 
characteris tic  — solitude - -  represents the sacred foundation fo r  an 
emerging "w il1-o f-the-land" philosophy. That wilderness solitude is the 
"Sacred W ill-o f-the-Land ,"  contests the trad it io n a l agency in terpre­
tation of the concept and requires a more primal-relig ious-philosophic  
explication fo r  th is  cosmology (c f .  prologue). Hence, this thesis is 
intended to speak both to a re lig ion  and a philosophy of wilderness. 
Contemporary scholars -  e .g . ,  Nash (1982), Hendee, Stankey & Lucas 
(1978), Tuan (1974), Graber (1976) and others have largely ignored the 
deeper relig ious and philosophic investigations of primal peoples 
a tt itu d e s , views and values of wilderness. These scholars project the 
imperialism of anthropocentrism - -  i . e . ,  human chauvinism - -  onto primal 
peoples and conclude th a t ,  fo r  example, "wilderness had no counterpart 
in the old world" and that " i f  paradise was man's greatest good, 
wilderness, i ts  antipode was his greatest e v il"  (Nash 1982). This view 
is in error as evidenced by Chapters IV — "Nature Awe: C e lt ic  Views of
Wildness" — and I I I  — "W ill-of-the-Land: Wilderness Among Early
Indo-Europeans." Wilderness as the cognate fo r  "sacred grove" and other 
trad it io n a l "wildland sanctuaries" reserved fo r  sacred princip les ,  
l i t e r a l l y  derivates as " w il l -o f - th e - la n d ,"  thereby implying a complex 
religious-philosophic nature ethos. Furthermore, solitude, in origin  
and meaning, breaks down to "soul" and "mood," hence implying the 
sublime and the solemn which are characteris tic  of the sacred (c f .  
Chapter I I ) .  These derivations fo r  wilderness solitude - -  the "Sacred 
W ill-of-the-Land" - -  impart an understanding of the deeper underlying 
principles which are manifest in the wild condition and. are inherent to 
re lig ious and philosophic acknowledgements. Such references are the 
quick of primal peoples' sacred insights into principal ( tha t which 
manifests in agent form) and Principle (tha t which creates and underlies 
as motive) force which is the locus of the Algonkians' Kitchi Manitou 
concept and the early  Indo-European "wildness in principle" (c f .  Chapter 
IV ).  Out of this primal understanding, we can discern a c learer picture  
of w i l l  (w ild ) and rationalism (c f .  Chapter V) which should in turn 
fu rther our sacred-ethical relations with the W ill-of-the-Land.
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PREFACE
In 1979, I was employed as a professional wilderness specia list  
(outdoor recreation planner and forester) for the Rock Springs D is tr ic t ,  
Bureau of Land Management, USDI. At th is time, we were conducting 
wilderness reviews of the public lands at the mandate of the 1976 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act. During this review, I became 
very concerned over the wilderness review c r i te r ia  and began 
investigating i t  in a more conceptual manner. Subsequently in 1980, I 
began graduate studies at the University of Montana with the intent of 
explicating wilderness solitude. The breadth of this topic became 
apparent in the second year of my studies and in the f a l l  1982, my 
committee met deciding that I should narrow the specific focus. 
Consequently, we agreed to focus upon the sacred cosmological ideals of 
wilderness solitude. Hence, the present format is fundamentally a 
product of my Religious Studies training and scholarship.
In this endeavor, I would l ik e  to make several acknowledgements of 
gratitude. To the wilderness in manifesting the w il l -o f-th e - la n d  where 
I 'v e  found myself, in my soul a primary wildness. Despite d i f f ic u lt ie s  
with the BLM, USDI, I am indebted to i t  fo r  my professional experiences 
in reviewing potential wilderness areas and for further kindling my 
in terest in the wilderness solitude concept. That this thesis begins to 
reconcile other professionals' understanding of the wilderness c r i te r ia  
as specified by the 1964 Wilderness Act, I am pleased to hold no malice
or i l l  feelings towards the BLM, and my former colleagues - -  both 
supervisors and professional peers.
I am very much indebted to my committee who have a ll  exhibited 
great in terest in my project and my personal growth as a human being.
My chair, Joseph Epes Brown, has provided me the most exemplary 
inspiration possible. To this great scholar, I am extremely indebted. 
That I may someday emulate his work and strength of character is my 
highest aspiration. Professor Thomas H. Birch has been a very great 
advisor, mentor and fr iend. His guidance and advice have been 
invaluable influencing the deepest depths of my soul. For this kindness 
and friendship, I am eternally  in gratitude. That I may aspire to such 
a fu l l  level of humanness is my worthy goal. Other committee members - -  
Robert R. Ream, John R. Means and John F. Lawry - -  have greatly enhanced 
this project with th e ir  counsel, knowledge and motivation. To each I am 
very gra te fu l. Other particu la r ly  in fluen tia l scholars who have 
contributed th e ir  advice and knowledge and to whom I am very indebted 
include: Peter Nabokov who introduced me to "sacred geography" which
has so permeated this thesis; Lance A. Olsen whose c r i t ic a l  reading and 
deep insights have been an invaluable asset to this work; and Professor 
Bryan T. Black who has provided much insightful and enlightening wisdom.
Furthermore, this acknowledgement must recognize the contribution 
of many good friends who have read each chapter in rough form and 
contributed suggestion of very great import while s p il l in g  beer over the 
manuscripts — p articu larly  on "Thorsdays." This group acknowledged as
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the "Thorsday League" of "Anarchists, Pagan Heathens and Zen Buddhists" 
includes John C. Bhend, Andy Stroble, Jon Davis (on occasion), Mike 
Copeland, Thomas Hartman and several others. Other academicians who 
have contributed with interest to this thesis include Professors:
Robert Ammons, Anthony Beltramo, William Bevis, Gregg Cawley, Paul 
D ie trich , John Driessen, Roger Dunsmore, Ron Erickson, Chris F ield ,
Duane Hampton, Charles Jonkel, Ellsworth LeBeau, P h il l ip  Maloney, Dexter 
Roberts, William P i t t  Root, and Stanley Rose. Furthermore, I am deeply 
indebted to B il l  Cunningham and the Montana Wilderness Association — 
especially for the "keep i t  wild" s p i r i t ,  Ken Wall and the Wilderness 
In s t i tu te ,  and Jerry Oltman, Equipment and Development Center, USFS.
F in a lly , I am grateful to the many other friends and associates at 
the University of Montana who have vicariously contributed to this  
e f fo r t  in classes, discussions and with th e ir  friendship.
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PROLOGUE: The Question of Wilderness Solitude
The purpose of this thesis is the study of solitude as i t  relates  
to wilderness. Although the 1964 Wilderness Act mandated that 
opportunities fo r solitude exist in wilderness, i t  fa ile d  to 
conceptualize and define this solitude condition. Wilderness 
professionals and public land managers consequently have found 
themselves employing contradictory notions of solitude in th e ir  attempts * 
to assess i ts  quality  and quantity in wilderness and potential 
wilderness areas (during, fo r example, R.A.R.E, R.A.R.E. I I  and the BLM 
wilderness review process). Solitude assessment has by no means been an 
easy task, primarily because i t  lacked an adequate application formula. 
This is because there has been no clear understanding of the concept of 
solitude i t s e l f .  For example, during the 1979 Bureau of Land Managment 
(USDI) Wilderness Review, one d is t r ic t  manager suggested that he had no 
idea whatsoever of the meaning and application of the solitude concept 
in wilderness.(1) His lack of understanding forced him to conclude that 
he could find solitude in a closet and he rhe torica lly  asked "why are we 
looking fo r i t  [solitude] in a l l  these wide-open spaces?" Of course, 
solitude in a closet is a r t i f i c i a l  and something very d if fe ren t from 
that characteristic to "wide-open spaces" or other wilderness settings. 
Solitude in a closet lacks whatever i t  is that stimulates the 
"wilderness experience." In another case, a 1980 guest lecturer at the 
University of Montana stated that he could not understand the wilderness
1
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solitude concept, but that he did find solitude at his own breakfast 
table each morning.(2) These amusing but high-handed dismissals of the 
v a lid ity  of solitude as one of the characteristics of wilderness may be 
allayed with this e x p lic i t  analysis of the concept's meaning.
That public land management agencies (Forest Service - -  USDA; Park 
Service, Fish & W ild life  Service and the Bureau of Land Management — 
USDI; and sim ilar agencies of several states) iden tify  wilderness 
solitude is a matter of recent legal history. While large acreages of 
defacto wilderness remained in North America following the European 
invasion and domination of the continent, i t  was only during the la te  
19th century that serious concern became manifest fo r  wilderness 
preservation. At f i r s t ,  National Parks were the principal wilderness 
preserved (c f .  Huth 1972: ch. 9, 148-164; also Nash 1982: ch.7,
108-121; and Hendee, Stankey & Lucas 1978: 30-33). During this call
fo r  wilderness preservation, much was written by romantic and 
transcendental philosophers, but no c lear, ra tio n a lly  reasoned 
defin it io n  of wilderness appeared.(3) Thus, the National Parks were 
established with vague conceptions of wilderness and its  
characteristics.
Following the National Parks precedent, spec if ica lly  detailed  
wilderness formulations began to occur fo r the National Forests (c f .
Nash 1982: ch. 12, 200-236; also Hendee, et al 1978: 33-36), In the
1920's, the Forest Service started by establishing a series of 
wilderness designations known as "primitive areas." Forest Service 
researchers (Hendee, et al 1978:33) have called this move by th e ir  
agency "the f i r s t  steps toward the e x p lic i t  id en tif ica tio n  of wilderness
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as a specific recreational resource and the development of appropriate 
management techniques." This action by the Forest Service was 
formulated on a f i r s t  attempt to qualify  wilderness character. Writing 
in 1921, forester Aldo Leopold posited that a prim itive area ideally  
should be "a continuous stretch of country preserved in its  natural 
state, open to lawful hunting and fish ing , big enough to absorb a 2-week 
pack t r ip ,  and kept devoid of roads, a r t i f i c ia l  t r a i ls ,  cottages, or 
other works of man." (Hendee, et al 1978:35) Leopold was subsequently 
successful in convincing the Chief of the Forest Service to formulate a 
regulation (known as L-20) establishing prim itive areas, which were 
defined as "areas managed to maintain prim itive conditions of 
'environment, transportation, habitation, and subsistence, with a view 
to conserving the value of such areas for the purposes of public 
education and recreation .'"  (Hendee, e t al 1978:61) Weak in character, 
the L-20 regulation was replaced in the 1930's by more substantive 
wilderness formulations known as the U regulations. The U regulations 
were influenced by Robert Marshall who was the chief of the Division of 
Recreation and Lands in the Forest Service. These regulations began to 
broaden the purpose of American wilderness preservation and specify more 
of its  character. Under the U-regulations three wildland use 
designations were specified. These designations included wilderness 
areas — "tracts of land not less that 100,000 acres;" wild areas — 
"tracts of land between 5,000 and 100,000 acres;" and roadless areas 
which "were to be managed principally  fo r recreation use 'substantia lly  
in th e ir  natural condition.'"  (Hendee, et al 1978:62-63)."
Solitude as a character t r a i t  of wilderness is lega lly  f i r s t
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acknowledged with the introduction and passage of the Wilderness Act (in  
the 1950's & early 60 's ).  In identifying wilderness areas as places 
having "outstanding opportunities for solitude" [Sec. 2 (c )(a )  1964 
Wilderness Act], Howard Zahnizer (the principal author of the Act) 
appears to be acknowledging the romantic and transcendental philosophies 
which make solitude (in its  sublime and solemn correlatives) so much an 
ideal of wilderness.
Subsequent agency interpretations of the 1964 Wilderness Act have 
fa iled  to acknowledge solitude in its  romantic and transcendental ideal 
as i t  characterizes the sublime and solemn quality  of wilderness. Their 
avoidance of these historica l precedents - -  to solitude — as 
established in the Romantic and Transcendental Movements is patently  
manifest in agency wilderness review c r i t e r i a . (4) I n i t i a l l y  three 
Federal agencies were directed to conduct public land reviews for  
wilderness s u ita b i l i ty .  The lands and agencies involved were the 
National Forests administered by the Forest Service, USDA; the National 
Parks administered by the Park Service, and the National W ild life  
Refuges administered by the Fish & W ild life  Service, both of the USDI. 
Subsequently, several states passed wilderness leg is la tion  and required 
th e ir  appropriate land management agencies to review and study suitable  
state administered lands for wilderness s u i ta b i l i ty .  F in a lly , the most 
recent authorization for wilderness review appears as the mandate of the 
Bureau of Land Management (USDI) in the 1976 Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA). That legal wilderness review mandates were 
given to public land management agencies fosters a responsibility  onto 
such agencies for interpreting h istorical and legal wilderness
5
precedents fo r the purpose of conceptualizing suitable wilderness review 
c r i te r ia  [ le g a lly  respectful of sec. 2 (c) defin it ion  of wilderness,
1964 Wilderness Act]. With regard to wilderness solitude, what has been 
the approach and product of agency wilderness c r i te r ia  formulations?(5) 
Two USDI agencies - -  the National Park Service and the Fish & W ild life  
Service - -  appear to have taken a laissez fa ire  approach when 
conceptualizing wilderness review c r i te r ia .  Both agencies in reviewing 
potential wilderness areas concluded that areas meeting the size and 
naturalness c r i te r ia  of the 1964 Wilderness Act automatically possessed 
outstanding opportunities for solitude unless otherwise proven. This 
approach appears to accept fundamental premises of historical arguments 
for the preservation of wilderness as voiced by the Romantic and 
Transcendental Movements.(6) In contrast, the c r i te r ia  established by 
the USDA - Forest Service, and the USDI -  BLM have generated substantial 
controversy and deserve close scrutiny.
The Forest Service began wilderness review with a process entit led  
Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE). In this in i t i a l  endeavor, a 
wilderness quality  index was developed based on ratings of scenic value, 
isolation potentia l, and variety of available recreational experiences. 
This wilderness quality  index (WQI) was severely c r it ic ize d  for its  
conceptual and methological weakness and inconsistent application. 
Critiques of the WQI and general public disapproval of the in i t ia l  RARE 
process led the Forest Service to formulate a second method - -  the 
Wilderness A ttribute Rating System (WARS) - -  fo r  conducting a second 
Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE I I ) .  Very l i t t l e  pertinent 
information concerning the nature of wilderness solitude can be obtained
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from the RARE I WQI because i t  fa iled  to acknowledge the characteristic
as defined in the 1964 Wilderness Act. That i t  posited "isolation
potential" as a c r ite rion  for candidate wilderness areas demonstrates a
solitariness interpretation for the solitude concept as i t  relates to
wilderness. This interpretation appears weak and shallow in lieu  of an
etymological derivation for the solitude conceptual disposition, (c f .
Ch. 2) The WARS system of RARE I I  is more specific in formulating
wilderness solitude c r i te r ia .  WARS attempts to determine outstanding
opportunities fo r  solitude identify ing the following components for
basing an evaluative rating:
size of area, topographic screening, vegetative screening, distance 
from perimeter to core, human intrusions, scaled as to th e ir  degree 
of impact on opportunity for solitude (USFS, WARS 1977:7)
The Forest Service based this in terpretation of wilderness solitude upon
a narrowly constricted defin it ion  which posits that
Solitude is defined as being isolated from the sights, sounds, 
and presence of others and from the developments and evidence of 
man. Solitude is a psychological state that varies form one 
individual to another — what is a crowd to one person may be 
solitude to another. However, the issue is not one of defining the 
re la t ive  human density levels of each area; that can be changed by 
management. Instead, the rating system focuses on those in tr in s ic  
features of the roadless areas that o ffe r  users outstanding 
opportunities fo r solitude - -  size of the area, presence of 
vegetation, topographic screening, and so fo rth . (USFS, WARS 
1977:27)
While the Forest Service continues in i ts  WARS manual to qualify  the 
" in tr in s ic  features" which i t  iden tif ies  with opportunities fo r  
solitude, these are not necessary fo r the purposes of this thesis 
presentation. Moreover, the core concern of this thesis is the 
formulation and conceptualization of the in i t ia l  de fin it ion  - -  i . e . ,  
defin it ion  in principle — of the wilderness solitude condition. Thus,
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the preceding Forest Service formulation provides and adequate basis for
considering the agency's approach to conceptualizing wilderness
solitude. Before assessing the Forest Service formulation, i t  is
logical to present the consistently s im il ia r  formulation of the BLM.
Like the Forest Service, the BLM had d i f f ic u l ty  distinguishing
between opportunities fo r solitude or prim itive and unconfined
recreation. The BLM posits that
In most cases, the two opportunities could be expected to go 
hand-in-hand. However, the outstanding opportunity fo r  solitude 
may be present in an area offering only limited prim itive  
recreational potentia l. Also an area may be so a ttrac tiv e  for  
recreation use that i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to maintain opportunity 
for solitude. Examples are around lakes or other bodies of water. 
In summary, an inventory unit must provide and be managed to 
maintain an outstanding opportunity fo r an individual to experience 
e ither solitude or a nonmotorized and nondeveloped type of 
recreation. [USDI-BLM, Wilderness Inventory Handbook (WIH) 1978:13]
Furthermore, the BLM concluded that i t  was essential to define both
"outstanding" and "opportunity" as a means of measuring solitude,
- -  Outstanding: Standing out among others of i ts  kind;
conspicuous; prominent. Superior to others of i ts  kind; 
distinguished; excellent.
— Opportunity: An appropriate or favorable time or occasion. A
situation or condition favorable for attainment of a goal.
(c f .  WIH 1978:13)
In ongoing research, I have extracted and lo g ica lly  ordered the basic 
quality  indices — d e f in it io n , t r a i t s ,  determination, considerations and 
constraints — which the BLM formulated fo r wilderness solitude.
1. Defin ition - -  The WIH (1978:13) explains that dictionaries
define solitude as: "the state of being alone or remote from
others; iso lation. A lonely or secluded place."
2. Traits  — "Factors or elements influencing solitude may include 
size, natural screening, and a b i l i t y  of the user to find a 
secluded spot. I t  is the combination of these and similar
8
elements upon which an overall solitude determination w il l  be 
made." (WIH 1978:13)
3. Determination - -  "Determine whether or not the area has 
outstanding opportunities for solitude. This is not an easy
determination to make and good judgments w ill  be required. In
making this determination, consider factors which influence 
solitude only as they affect a person's opportunity to avoid 
the sights, sounds and evidence of other people in the inventory 
u n it."  (WIH 1978:13)
Cf. "In evaluating solitude, re fer to the defin it ion  on page 13 
[WIH 1978:13]. The intent was to evaluate the opportunities 
that a person has to avoid the sights, sounds, and evidence of 
other people in the same un it, rather than to evaluate 
opportunity for solitude in comparison to habitations of man 
[Organic Act D irective #78-61, Change 3, item l . f (3 ) (p p .2 -3 )  & 
0AD#78-61, Change 2, item 3.e. (p .7 ) ] ."
4. Considerations - -  " I t  may be d i f f i c u l t ,  fo r example, to avoid
the sights and sounds of people in a f l a t  open area unless i t  is 
re la t iv e ly  large. A small area, however, may provide 
opportunities fo r solitude i f ,  due to topography or vegetation, 
v is ito rs  can screen themselves from one another." (WIH 1978:13)
5. Constraints — ." I t  is erroneous to assume that simply because a 
unit or portion of a unit is f l a t  and/or unvegetated, i t  
automatically lacks an outstanding opportunity for solitude. I t  
is also incorrect to automatically conclude that simply because 
a unit is re la t iv e ly  small, i t  does not have an outstanding 
opportunity fo r solitude. Consideration must be given to the 
in terre lationship between size, screening, configuration, and 
other factors that influence solitude [0AD#78-61, Change 3, item 
1 - f . ( 3 ) (pp.3—4 ) ] ."
There are logical problems inherent to both of these agencies' 
assessment procedures for determining wilderness solitude. Moreover, 
the defin itions and procedures posited by each agency constitute serious 
errors; they are both categoreally mistaken and a lle g o r ica lly  
misconceived which subsequently results in qualita t ive  and quantative 
deception. Categoreally, that isolation should constitute the total 
meaning of wilderness solitude, implies that solitude i t s e l f  is 
derivative of iso lation. While isolation may be a condition
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contributing to solitude, i t  is a categoreal mistake to present solitude  
as a product of iso la tion . In the isolation defin it ion  there is a 
mistaken tendency to' universally conceptualize solitude as a state of 
being alone, removed from others. This mistake denies the solitude 
concept i ts  wilderness relationship (c f .  Chapter I I ) .  Thus, the 
categoreal mistake compounds error and results in allegorical  
misconception with its  fa i lu re  to connect with a l l  of the solitude 
concept's relational meanings. The error debases and dishonors the 
s p ir i t  of the wilderness solitude concept. In this way, agency solitude 
d if in it io n s  are q u a lita t iv e ly  incorrect and thereby impoverished.
Furthermore, these errors are compounded in quantitative deception. 
F irs t ,  the agencies use the wrong category a mistake which is 
non-symbolic of motive principle or conceptual meaning and thereby 
without q u a lif ica tion . In establishing quantifiable parameters - -  such 
as, "size of area, topographic & and vegetative screening, etc. - -  the 
agencies are masking the disposition of wilderness solitude. Moreover, 
the agencies posit q u a lita t ive  isolation conditions which are 
recognizable, in order to claim o b je c tiv ity , while fa i l in g  to provide 
quantitative standards and procedures by which to measure these. Yet, 
they claim objective quantification. WARS and BLM wilderness inventory 
guidelines specify features which are of an objective material nature 
but o ffe r  only qualita tive  ratings fo r  th e ir  assessment while claiming 
to substantiate quantification. This deception is evident in 
recognizing the a b i l i t y  to quantify qua lita t ive  features or conditions 
associated with the isolation d e fin it io n . For example, a cartographer 
can identify  physical screening from a topographic map and delineate
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those areas which qualify  in offering opportunities fo r iso la tion . This
is a re la t iv e ly  simple task which is easily  quantatifiable - -  i . e . ,
objectively one might conclude from the cartographer's assessment that
X percent of the area offers topographic screening suitable for
iso lation. Sim ilarly vegetative screening analysis may be o b je c tif ied ,
as well as core dimensions, etc. Thus in th e ir  fa i lu re  to develop
ob jec tif iab le  quantatification the agencies foster quantatificative
deception which is mere il lusionary qualif ica tion  that selects against
th e ir  a lle g o r ic a lly  misconceived features of conditions.
Mindful of these fundamental errors, how ought we factor out the
d istinctions, meanings and values associated with wilderness
solitude?(7) The 1964 Wilderness Act re flects  a rich heritage of values
which have evolved over many years though a diverse array of minds.
Acknowledging this condition, legal analyst Michael McCloskey (1966)
comments on the background and meaning of the wilderness leg is la tion :
The evolution [of the 1964 Wilderness Act] has blended many 
p o l i t ic a l ,  religous and cultural meanings into deeply f e l t  personal 
convictions . . . Those who administer that law must look to these 
convictions to understand why the law exists.
The legal re a l i ty  which this law (the 1964 Wilderness Act) represents
should be viewed in proper context and i t  is this context which provides
a basis fo r factoring out the de fin it ion  in principle of wilderness
solitude.
In the complex web that is societal values, we are dependent upon 
moral mandates for fostering the social in teres t. Such mandates are 
properly acknowledged as law. But what is the foundation for law?
Legal formulations are intended to secure equality and justice  fo r the
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social in teres t. In princ ip le , the law thus re flects  the moral 
imperative which is the ethos of a people. The foundation of law then 
is necessarily dependent upon an ethical formulation. Ethical 
formulations re f le c t  deeper principles which ought themselves to 
constitute the realm of the sacred. I t  is in this context that a law 
such as the 1964 Wilderness Act emerges. We, therefore, must begin 
factoring out the d istinctions, meanings and values inherent to the 1964 
Wilderness Act by investigating the culture's sacred ethos which is 
i t s e l f  the province of religous studies. Hence the sacred origins are 
the central focus fo r  this explication of wilderness solitude.
These sacred origins of wilderness solitude are l in g u is t ic a l ly  the 
product of Indo-European culture. Mindful of this cultural relativism  
where ought this explication begin? Do we begin with Medieval World 
views, or with the sacred traditions and cosmologies of primal Europe? 
H is to rica lly  the Medieval ethos is largely the product of Christian  
influence and C hristian ity  i t s e l f  is a hybridization of several mid-east 
cults (Coulton 1964: 10-11) with the pagan heathenism of primal Europe. 
In many ways, this Christian hybridization is a i t s e l f  a profanation of 
the European pagan heathen traditions which are largely earth or 
ecologically centered whereas C hris tian ity  is primarily an abstract 
humanist trad ition  exto lling  a human chauvinism. In order to gain 
proper insight into the conceptual origins of wilderness solitude, we
12
must, therefore examine the primal European traditions which generated 
the concept.
CHAPTER I
NATURE AWE: Celtic  Views of Wildness*
The trad itiona l theme of sacred natural places, free from 
desecration by humans and th e ir  technology, is an ancient land ideal.  
These sacred natural places were wilderness in the deepest sense. 
Contemporary scholarship, however, implies that only members of our 
modern cultures can appreciate such wilderness. Wilderness historian  
Roderick Nash (1982), for example, suggests that "wilderness had no 
counterpart in the old world" and that " i f  paradise was man's greatest 
good, wilderness, i ts  antipode-, was his greatest e v i l . "  The 
implication is that wilderness is " ins tin ctive ly  understood as 
something alien to man -  an insecure and uncomfortable environment 
against which c iv i l iz a t io n  had waged an unceasing struggle."
Perhaps in terms of the modern b e lie f  in a dichotomy of wilderness 
versus c iv i l iz a t io n ,  th is  is true. But there is a primal reverence for 
'w ild ' nature that predates the medieval/renaissance world view with its  
exto lling  of human chauvinism and its  arrogant b e lie f  in the in tr in s ic  
value of c iv i l i z a t io n . (1)
♦Published in On Earth Magazine, Oct/Nov 1983, Vol. 4, #1, Forres, 
Scotland: Findhorn Foundation. A more extensive original version
appeared in Spring, 1983, vol. nine, no. 1, Western Wildlands, Missoula: 
Montana Forest and Conservation Station, School of Forestry, University 
of Montana. Reprinted in Wilderness, no. 15, Dec. 1983 B e l la ir ,  Natal, 
R.S.A.: Wilderness Leadership School.
13
14
The problem with contemporary scholars' h istorical treatment of 
wilderness is that they do not investigate the values of primal 
people. Nash concentrated his historical review of the wilderness 
concept on medieval Europe and ignored pre-Christian inhabitants -  the 
early European cultures that thrived outside the rule of imperial 
Rome.
As the Roman State adopted C h ris tian ity , the Romans extended th e ir  
imperial power over the primal peoples of northern Europe. In the 
Roman synthesis of C hris tian ity  and federalism, the wild took on the 
evil connotation of a desolate waste -  a wilderness f i l l e d  with demons 
and dev ils , witches and wizards who could take the shape of crows and 
ravens to do evil tr icks  and magic. Henry G ilbert 's  Robin Hood (1912) 
includes examples of th is  imperial Christian attitude  towards 'w ild ' 
nature which influenced the superstitions of medieval serfs. The 
serfs were required to cross themselves as a sacred sign before 
entering a forest to ward o f f  ev il s p ir i ts .  "To th e ir  simple minds 
they were risking the loss not only of th e ir  l iv e s , but of th e ir  
immortal souls, by venturing into these wild places, the haunts of 
wood-demons, t r o l ls  and witches." Imperial Christians used th is  a t t i ­
tude toward wild nature as a way of overpowering the nature deities  
that dominated Europe's primal cultures.
Much modern scholarship is the product of an im peria lis tic  t r a d i ­
tion that can be traced to Rome. Findings are thus skewed by an ina­
b i l i t y  to fathom the primal mind and i ts  values. This in a b i l i ty  has 
led to a tota l disregard of the a lternative  trad itions of primal
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cultures which centered th e ir  beliefs upon sacred 'w ild ' nature -  'the 
mother'.
The early Celts were an Old World people who passed down to us an 
ancient counterpart to our modern concept of wilderness. The Celts 
expressed th e ir  s p ir i tu a l i ty  through worship of nature. The trad itions  
of th e ir  'Nature Awe' re lig ion , also known as Druidism, date back 3,000 
years to the emergence of the Celts as a race .(2)
Originating in Bohemia, the Celtic  tribes were the primary inhabi­
tants of Europe during the pre-Roman period, covering more than half  
the continent. They were linked by language, re lig ion and culture. 
C eltic  Europe extended from the west shores of the Black Sea to the 
extremes of the B rit ish  Is le s , from the western lim its  of the Iberian 
peninsula to the northern reaches of the Rhine and back to the far  
southern extent of the Alps.
The deepest roots of conservation and wilderness preservation are 
contained in the c iv i l iz a t io n  of our C eltic  European heritage. The 
teachings of the Druidic Nature Awe relig ion demonstrate a sacred 
ecology. MacCulluch (1948) explained that:
The e a r l ie s t  C eltic  worship, l ik e  that of most peoples, 
was given to s p ir its  of nature, of the sea, r ive rs , trees, 
mountains, sky and heavenly bodies. All parts of nature were 
a live .. .w here  there was but one object of i ts  kind -  sun, moon, 
earth, sea -  the s p ir i t  of each would tend to become a being 
more or less separated from i t ,  yet s t i l l  ruling i t  or 
connected with i t ,  a sun, moon, earth or sea deity . Thus in 
time, besides the greater gods of nature, there would also be 
groups of nature s p ir i ts ,  connected with r ive rs , forests, 
mountains and other parts of nature.
This trad it io n  of Nature Awe found expression in a l l  phases of the
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peoples' l ive s . For example, the people were inclined to take oaths 
such as, "May the sky fa l l  upon my head," in order to insure th e ir  
f id e l i t y  of promise. "On each occasion the man uttering the oath 
calls  on the forces of nature, thus acknowledging that any fa i lu re  to 
keep his promise w il l  make him an outcast in the eyes not only of his 
own community but of the natural world and the gods who are above 
everyday l i f e . "  (Markale 1977)
One of the ways th is  trad ition  of Nature Awe found expression was 
in earth festiva l days l ik e  Beltane, Samain (Hallowe'en) etc. The 
Beltane fe s t iv a l ,  for example, occurred on May Day and accounts of the 
Druidic Rites associated with i t  a l l  point to purification and d iv i ­
nation. Both these concepts emphasize the re-emergence of l i f e  asso­
ciated with the coming of spring.
During the Beltane fe s t iv a l ,  f ires  were l i t ,  people danced around 
the Maypole and the Druids recited incantations. These r ite s  may be 
interpreted as an attempt to aid the coming of spring. The f ire s  
symbolized the warming season and i ts  greening e ffec t upon the earth. 
In the dance around the Maypole, the streamers became entwined to form 
a canopy sim ilar to that of a liv ing  tre e , urging i t  to flower and 
leout. The Druidic incantations were an added attempt to summon forth  
the 'sleeping* s p ir its  of the plants and hasten th e ir  greening while 
establishing a sacred bond between human and plant. The Beltane r ites  
were thus practices of sacred ecology associated with the greening of 
spring and a celebration of joy at th is  marvelous natural event. They 
reflected communion with nature and the moral obligation of l iv in g  
with the Earth.
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The Celts practised th e ir  relig ion in open a ir  sanctuaries. These 
sanctuaries were associated with the worship of trees (oaks in 
particu lar) and were known as nemetons. Nemetons are recognized as 
the e a r l ie s t  places of worship among the Celts. They were sacred gro­
ves deep within the forest, and the people made wilderness pilgrimages 
to them in order to worship. The 'w ild ' surroundings that protected 
the groves were part of th e ir  sacred condition.
The wild forest nemeton carried a land designation quality  similar  
to the modern wilderness area. In order to see th is ,  one must put 
aside the largely recreational valuation accorded contemporary w ilder­
ness areas. I t  is not our current idea of using the land for  
recreation, but rather the characteristic  of solitude that contributes 
to the sublime 'nature awe' feeling in a wilderness area.
In origin and meaning, the term 'so litude' can be broken down to 
'soul' and 'mood'. In th is  sense, solitude is sim ilar to i ts  etymolo­
gical s is ter 'solemn' and i ts  corollary 'sublime', both of which are 
central to the Nature Awe sp ir itua l t ra d it io n .
Nemetons were also sacred places where the Druids learned th e ir  
lore and developed th e ir  wisdom. The Druids were a l i t e r a r y ,  r e l i ­
gious and philosophical order who guided the Celts' moral and s p ir i ­
tual a f fa irs .  Young people who aspired to be Druids had to study for 
up to 30 years to enter the order. There were several levels to the 
Druidic order, of which the t i t l e  of Druid was the most esteemed and 
exclusive. There was no more highly respected position in the society 
than that of the Druid, who knew the most about nature. Evidence is
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that i t  was an ega litar ian  o ff ice  and that i ts  power was respected in 
the society regardless of the Druid's sex. Commonly, Druids were 
known as the wise persons of the oak, receiving th e ir  power and wisdom 
from the nemeton. From this we can see how important the sacred groves 
were to the society.
The nemeton was central to the Celtic  people's relationship to the 
land and to th e ir  understanding of the tru th . The wild conditioned 
the s p ir i tu a l ,  sacred experience by imbuing the people with a sense of 
the sublime. The wisdom of the s p ir its  of wood and stream, lea f and 
flower, was the foundation of the union of humanity and wild nature, 
thus the land and i ts  health were central themes of the whole Celtic  
world view. The Druids were charged with the understanding of eco­
logy. From the wisdom they gathered in th e ir  study of the 'w ild ' in 
th e ir  nemetons, they guided the people's actions as they related to 
the environment (ecological e th ic s ) . (3)
Glimmerings of the Druidic wilderness ethic may be seen in the
Arthurian legend. Arthur, l ik e  a l l  Celtic  ru lers , was married to the
land. The archetypal Druid, Merlin, explained what i t  meant to be 
King. “You w ill  be the land and the land w il l  be you. I f  you f a i l ,  
the land w ill  perish; as you th r iv e , the land w il l  blossom." The King 
represented humanity in marriage to the land.
This communion between humanity and wild nature was broken with
the coming of imperial C hris tian ity . The Celtic  c iv i l iz a t io n  did not 
f a i l  na tura lly . I t  was conquered by the Romans and displaced by 
force, the Druids put to death and the sacred groves burned. Celtic
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c iv i l iz a t io n  was crushed by oppression, much l ik e  the annihilation of
Native American cultures by Euro-Americans. Imperial C hris tian ity
adopted a purposeful strategy to assimilate the sacred groves into
church in s titu t io n s , v io lating the nemetons by building human-made
temples in sacred wilderness and v iolating the earth worship days by
making them church holidays.(4) There was, however, often resistance in
rural areas, and the church had to resort to threatening the people's
immortal souls, as well as burning 'non-believers' at the stake in
order to e ffec t the desired change of worship.
»
The medieval world view which Nash projects back over 'early  man' 
is f i l l e d  with forboding against wilderness.(5) But bearing in mind the 
Nature Awe viewpoint, i t  makes l i t t l e  sense to call wilderness early  
'man's' greatest e v i l .  A fter a l l ,  i t  was in wilderness that humans 
evolved and learned, adapted also i t  the wild nourished and selected for 
humans; otherwise, how could the species have survived and emerged 
dominant? Wilderness served as early humanity's greatest good, not 
th e ir  greatest e v i l .
The Celts recognized this and centered th e ir  s p ir itu a l traditions  
upon the 'w ild ' earth. I t  is clear that these primal peoples had a 
much more sophisticated world view than previously believed. They had 
th e ir  own environmental ethic which reflected love, respect and 
admiration for the 'w i ld ' .
In contrast to the primal Nature Awe concept of the sacred 
wildlands, the modern Western view is largely u t i l i t a r ia n .  I t  does 
not readily exhibit the solemn awe of the ancient cultures or the love
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and worship of nature. But the resurfacing of the wilderness concept 
in America today demonstrates our species' determination to avoid 
separation from the wild source that gave us b ir th . Despite the fear 
of the wildlands and th e ir  trad itions that developed in medieval 
Europe, those primal trad itions re-emerged in the Romantic and 
Transcendental periods, culminating in America in the creation of a 
National Wilderness Preservation System.
But we need to remember that the American concept of wilderness is 
new and innovative only within the confines of the Western trad it io n  
of u t i l ita r ia n is m  and humanism. Since the e a r l ie s t  times, wildlands 
have been treated as sacred space free from a lte ration  by humans. The 
modern wilderness characteristic  of solitude ( 'soul-mood') may be the 
cornerstone to a minority contemporary view of wilderness as sacred 
space, and represents a re-emergence of the ancient Nature Awe in its  
recognition of the sacred, solemn and sublime relig ion of the 'w i ld ' .  
This is perhaps the most profound of a l l  the values associated with 
the wilderness concept.
CHAPTER I I
THE EDGE OF WITHIN
Solitude in Origin and Meaning
We must find what is lo s t! '  The g r a i l ,  only the gra il can 
restore le a f  and flower. Search the land, the labybrinth of 
the forest, to the edge of within . . . .
King Arthur in 
"Excalibur"
(Boorman 1981)
As Arthur suggests, there is an im p lic it  connection between the 
fo res t, the edge of w ith in , and the grail (e th ics ). The ancient Celtic  
Nature Awe cosmology contains a sacred-ethical-ecological ethos which is 
born of the peoples' worship in sacred groves or nemetons. Moreover, i t  
is to the forest - -  sacred grove, nemeton or wilderness sanctuary - -  
where Arthur directs his quest knights to find the gra il — i . e . ,  the 
sacred-ecological e th ic . For the Celts, then, i t  is in the wilderness 
where the sacred is most potently manifest. That solitude is 
"soul-mood" in deepest etymological derivation, combines this sacred 
condition with wilderness to produce the Nature Awe cosmology.
Arthur's action of sending the quest Knights to the fo res t, to seek 
and search for the gra il "to the edge of within . . . , "  is a demonstration 
of the deepest sense of wilderness solitude. Let us examine these 
connections between the fo res t, solitude and the ethical which are a ll  
characteristic  to the Nature Awe cosmology. In early times, "a ll
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unenclosed land was fo res t1 (Shipley, p. 157 & 112). The Latin fors or 
fo r is  f i r s t  meant out of doors, and forest is short for the 
la te  Latin forestem silvam, the woods outside, or land which is not 
fenced in (S tip ley , p. 157 & 124; also c f . Oxford English Dictionary 
1971: 1055; 442). Thus, Arthur sent his quest knights to the 
out-of-doors, in order to find the edge of within. The out-of-doors or 
forest is central to Celtic  religious practice as manifest with th e ir  
designation of nemetons or wilderness sanctuaries. In the death of 
Arthur (LeMorte d 'A rthur), the King is taken to the mythical is le  of 
Avallon, i t s e l f  a refuge for wilderness solitude. Markale (1977:68) 
explains that Avallon may in fact be the modern s ite  of Glastonburg in 
western England and that the name also is said to have come from 
"Availoc who went to l ive  there with his daughters because of the 
solitude of the island." Fundamental to this contention is the need for  
solitude and a corresponding freedom from habitation and c iv i l iz a t io n .
Avallon, according to several sources, was indeed a "wild" 
setting. The theory that Glastonbury was Avallon confirms this  
wild character of the mythical is le .  Today, Glastonbury is a group 
of h i l ls  almost en tire ly  surrounded by f l a t  meadows. These meadows 
were formerly swamp and marshland often flooded by the River Brue. 
I t  was only through a narrow ridge that approaches the r ive r  to the 
southwest that this is le  could be reached in ancient times. The 
s ite  has been "explained as the tenemos or enclosure of a great 
pagan Celtic  sanctuary." Glastonbury is particulary well suited 
fo r  this purpose. Its  ample water provides many sacred pools and 
springs much lik e  those spoken of by the classical w riters . "The 
prominent natural h i l l  of the Tor is a feature that would f i t  in 
with the concept of a sanctuary. A sanctuary of this kind would 
consist of an extent of land with sacred groves..."(Ashe 1968).
Ashe explained th a t, "The existence of a great pagan sanctuary 
would explain the foundation of an early Christian settlement at 
Glastonbury. I t  would not be the f i r s t  time the Church took over 
heathen sacred sites and Christianized them: a policy recommended
by certain early w rite rs ."  This explanation of proponents of
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C hris tian ity 's  policy to assimilate the sacred groves into its  
order by building structured places of worship provides us with an 
important clue to the "wild" nature, of these pagan Celtic  
sanctuaries.
F irs t of a l l ,  the Is le  of Glastonbury is a substantial trac t  
of land, much like  any modern wilderness. I t  is worthy, then, of 
the larger grove designation of nemeton. There are two old Ir ish  
expressions, the nemed and the firnemed, both meaning a "sacred 
grove." I t  is l ik e ly  that the firnemed may have been an individual 
sacred grove within the nemed. This is consistent with our 
observation of the Is le  of Glastonbury. Within its  is land-like  
nature are several s ign ificant Christian s ites; among these are the 
Glastonbury Abbey, the Chalice h i l l .  St. Dunstan's Chapel and the 
Norman church atop the Tor. I t  is probable that these were sacred 
"wild" places of the Celtic  Nature Awe worship, according to the 
Christian assimilation policy. I f  so, they would be ancient 
firnemed sites within the larger encompassing nemed or nemeton. 
Hence, the concept of the nemeton is s im ilar to modern wilderness 
because both are large areas of "wild" lands with central places 
fo r  people to be alone (in  the "soul-mood").
In addition to Avallon or Glastonbury, there are at least two 
other major nemetons. In B rita in , an especially sacred grove was 
found in Nottinghamshire during Roman times. In Scotland another 
nemeton was located somewhere near the Antonine W a l l . ( l )
Further demonstrating the out-of-door, wilderness basis for the
forest of Arthur's quest, is the medieval legal defin it ion  for a forest.
The Oxford English Dictionary (1971:1055;442) states that forests were
"a woodland d is t r ic t ,  usually belonging to the king, set apart for
hunting wild beasts and game, etc ."  and "having special laws and
officers of i ts  own." Of course, this medieval example of the king's
forest or wildland is largely u t i l i t a r ia n  in motive and unlike the
cosmological dimension of the ancient Celtic  nemeton. This example,
however, demonstrates a heretofore undocumented way in which wilderness
area designation has h is to r ic a l ly  emerged in today's American land-use
policy. I t  is ,  however, the "Nature Awe" cosmology associated with the
forest which is of central concern in this wilderness solitude
24
explanation. That one is called to quest into the forest, searching and 
seeking "to the edge of within implies that our human nature is
i t s e l f  a reflection of the nature of the cosmos and that humans learn 
most about th e ir  nature from nature i t s e l f  where the wild is most 
potently discovered. This discovery is a central formulation of 
wilderness solitude in origin and meaning. Moreover, the root words for  
solitude are sol and tude which essentia lly  mean soul and mood -  or 
"soul-mood". This assessment becomes clear upon investigating the Latin 
solitude from which the English solitude derives. Solitude's  
etymological roots are sol vs -  tvdo (Glare 1980). The root word solus 
is an adjective. But what does i t  describe? Solus is not i t s e l f  a 
prime word, moreover i t  is derived from sol - -  "sun." Hence, sol is the 
Latin noun for the sun and is probably derived from sawel through sawol, 
swol which are cognate with the old I ta l ia n  suryah and surah. L i te ra l ly  
these mean to shine, sun, 'to burn', "especially to burn without flame, 
burn slowly" (Glare 1980; c f ,  Klien 1967; also Weekly 1967:1374). The 
strik ing connection which manifests i t s e l f  from this sol derivation of 
solus, is the transferrence into English. In migrating from Latin 
through old French, sol became soul in middle English (Skeat 1898:572). 
Thus, that which annimates the solar system,, the sol or sun, is also the 
core of the human as the soul. When combined with the -tude or tvdo 
s u ff ix ,  a soul state or condition is implied. The suffix  tude appears 
in abstract nouns when generally formed from Latin adjectives or 
partic ip les -  for example, la titude and a lt i tu d e . This model s im ilarly  
is the basis fo r the formation of new nouns, e .g . ,  p latitude. The
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abstract condition of these nouns is c learly  the product of the tude 
su ff ix . These nouns are thus lacking in detail and, therefore, the 
-tude implies abstraction as characterized by mental reasoning and 
in te llec tua l process - -  i . e . ,  thinking or contemplation. When we 
observe such thought action, we construe i t  as mood. Hence, -tude is a 
sense of the abstract state of mind or mood.
Soul-mood, as a solitude equivalent, is a cosmological ideal. I t  
expresses a sacred or sp ir itua l valuation of the w ild . Fundamentally, 
"soul-mood" is the basis on which William James (1982:31) defines 
relig ion as
the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in th e ir  
solitude, so fa r  as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation  
to whatever they may consider the d iv ine .
That William James defines relig ion with feelings, acts, and
experiences in solitude demonstrates the sacredness of the "soul-mood"
condition as put forth in this thesis. Soul-mood carries in tr in s ic a l ly
a sacred numinous valuation of the wild as manifest about us — both
inwardly and outwardly. The writings of philosopher Henry Bugbee (1974)
best a rt ic u la te  this sacred sense of solitude. He contents,
I think solitude is essentially  a bringing to consciousness of 
this - -  the manner of our being in the world with other beings - -  
and of engagement in the working out of the import continually and 
cumulatively borne upon us of partic ipation. I t ,  therefore, 
assumes the character of a reckoning, a coming to terms with one's 
very l i f e ,  with one's disposition with regard to beings as formed 
in the lived relation with them. But i f  one's basic disposition 
were to exert command over the situation in which one 'ex is ts ' so 
fa r  forth that would seem to preclude solitude (Bugbee 1974:4).
That the 'soul-mood' is a reckoning, demonstrates the Arthurian quest to
the "edge of w ithin ." Moreover, as Bugbee has shown, our being in the
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world is d irec tly  dependent upon interaction with other beings. This 
acknowledgement is the point of Arthur's instructions to go search the 
labybrinth of the forest - -  i . e . ,  the out-of-doors - - t h e  wilderness 
where being in i ts  manifold sense is most potently discovered. Hence, 
in order to understand one's own disposition, one is called to observe 
the "speakings" of the land, that is ,  the "w ill-o f-the -land"  (c f .
Chapter I I I ) ,  and this act of reckoning must be accomplished without 
in ten tiona lity  and the burden of desireful ness, le s t  we f a i l  in an 
affirmation of communion with others. Moreover, our sense of so lidar ity  
with other creatures must be founded not upon how we would u t i l iz e  them, 
but upon our shared creature!iness and jo in t  partic ipation in the world, 
such communion is the 'soul-mood' which manifests the sacred.
Solitude in the 'soul-mood' derivation is thus sacred in 
experience. I t  is concomitant with a sense of "the numinous" (c f .  Otto 
1982). Hence, the sacred is the reckoning of our "soul-mood," which is 
our holiness in communion with the others of the world.
The sacred calls  forth solemn devotion or religious observation — 
i . e . ,  r i t u a l ,  ceremony and r i t e .  Solemn deliberation is accompanied 
with meditation and atonement which in turn produce the sense of empathy 
and ecstasy. Such is the condition of holiness which characterizes the 
"soul-mood" of wilderness solitude and is demonstrative of the Arthurian 
quest to "the edge of w i th in . . . . "  "Soul-mood" properly should be 
recognized, as the quick of solitude. Hence i t  is the primal condition 
which is the basis of reckoning. '
What connections are requisite  fo r this "soul-mood" in its
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connection with the forest, that is the wilderness? Moreover, are there 
intermediary conditions of solitude which work to manifest "soul-mood"? 
Two trad itiona l defin itions — the void and sole — associated with the 
meaning of solitude imply that such is the case (2 ) .  Furthermore, a 
th ird  standard of solitude - -  the In te r io r  - -  d ire c t ly  connects the 
"soul-mood" with the wilderness i t s e l f  (2 ) .  The primary context of 
in terre lationship for these solitude themes is graphically depicted in 
figure 1. This in terre lationship is h o lis t ic  and dynamic at once which 
is a condition that inhib its  written discussion. As a re su lt ,  we must 
proceed singularly in thematic explication. Born of the In te r io r ,  there 
are two states — the void and sole - -  which work to generate 
"soul-mood" and which in turn re fle c t  upon our reckoning with the 
in te r io r .
The void is characterized by a complete absence or lack - -  i . e . ,  
dearth. In dealing with i t ,  there is a contingency of emergent w i l l ,  as 
in the sense which Bugbee articulated concerning our being in the world 
with other beings. Moreover, in solitude, we are confronted with the 
w ill-o f-th e - la n d  (c f .  Chapter I I I )  which calls  us to reckoning. I t  is 
th is sense of the void which f i l l s  us with the dearthful intimidation of 
wildness. The void may properly include threat, fea r, estrangement, 
sombriety, gloom and desolation, as well as ponderous silence and 
timelessness. Demonstrating this condition of solitude as "imposed 
upon" in reckoning with the w ild , is the case of Henry Thoreau's 1846 
v is its  to the Maine woods. Thoreau has been c r it ic ize d  fo r his 
commentary concerning these wilderness experiences. Moreover, Nash
Figure 1. Solitude in primary thematic context.
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(1982:91) contends,
The wilderness of Maine shocked Thoreau. He reported i t  as 
"even more grim and wild than you had anticipated, a deep and 
in tr ic a te  wilderness." Climbing Mt. Katahdin, he was struck by its  
contrast to the kind of scenery he knew around Concord. The wild 
landscape was "savage and dreary" and instead of his usual 
exaltation in the presence of nature, he f e l t  "more lone than you 
can imagine." I t  seemed as i f  he were robbed of his capacity for  
thought and transcendence. Speaking of man's situation in 
wilderness, he observed: "vast, T itan ic , inhuman Nature has got
him at disadvantage, caught him alone, and p i lfe rs  him of some of 
his divine faculty . She does not smile on him as in the plains."
While Thoreau has been tra d it io n a lly  interpreted as a Romantic id ea l is t
concerned for nature, these Maine experiences have been pointed to in
order to claim that only when one is c iv i l ize d  and comfortable can one
appreciate wilderness. This assessment may be unduly re flec t ive  of
Romantic idealism which is not en tire ly  Thoreau's philosophic grounding.
Moreover, in the Maine wilderness, Thoreau was confronted with the "bare
bones" of existence, the very core of r e a l i ty .  Such a confrontation is
the loneliness of "sheer a f f l ic t io n ,  stamped on a person as a f a ta l i t y
with the force of a stigm a..."  (Bugbee 1974:2). The rendering of this
kind of solitude — the void - -  is the d isorientation, the
u n fam ilia r ity , the strangeness of being stripped bare before creation,
i . e . ,  wildness. I t  is no longer a romantic idea l, but a purification of
soul, a preparation for understanding id en tity , and f in a l ly  a basis for
expansion. Confronting the void in this way is tru ly  the basis of
sacrif ice  which "entails some kind of giving up in consonance with an
unconditional claim upon concern..." (Bugbee 1974:12). In this case,
the unconditional concern which must be given up is egoism in the face
of the w i ll-o f-th e -lan d  (c f .  Chapter V). Hence, the void heightens the
30
urgency of the "soul-mood" as with the w il l -o f- th e - la n d .
The Romantic ideal projected onto Thoreau's wilderness perspective
is founded upon the sole theme of solitude. This condition is born upon
the sole-or-unique, that is ,  the sublimity which features of the wild
landscape inspire. In this ideal of solitude, one is struck in
wonderment before nature. This is wonderment over ra r i ty  or oddity, and
the awe-inspiring sense of majesty. Such esthetic contemplation
generates emotional g ra t if ic a t io n  and solace in our being. Mircea
Eliade (1959: 151-152) iden tif ies  this emotional g ra t if ic a t io n  as the
"esthetic, recreational, or hygienic values attributed to nature "
Furthermore, Eliade (1959:153-154) suggests that the wilderness is the
perfect place, combining completeness (mountain and water) with 
solitude, and thus perfect because at once the world in miniature
and Paradise, source of bliss and place of immortality.
This "esthetic contemplation" produces an emotion which is fundamentally
religious in experience. Thus, a religious dimension is i t s e l f  the
"soul-mood" of wilderness solitude (c f .  James 1982:31).
This solitude of sole or unique defin it ion  is the basis fo r the
Romantic and Transcendental Movements which are dependent upon
inspiration of place. David Douglas (1983) has recently articulated
this perspective in explaining certain sp ir itu a l values associated with
wilderness, that is ,  silence, solitude ( sole) , and awe. He contends
that silence draws people to wilderness and "has been an invaluable
catalyst fo r  prayer and contemplation." Furthermore, Douglas contends
that solitude "is 'the most sublime state a human being can aspire to
. . .  being in the wilderness alone with God.'" Wilderness is ,  thus, the
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"source for the 'b irth  of awe.'" Moreover, " i t  is the one setting that 
a sojourner is unable to claim as his own handiwork."
Indeed, wildness is the source, the maxim of creation i t s e l f .  We 
are here at i ts  pleasure. Contemplation of the source, the uniqueness 
of that which manifests i t s e l f  in wonder is thus the basis of the sole , 
unique or sublime meaning of solitude. I t  is the very foundation of the 
Romantic and Transcendental Movements which have so fo rce fu lly  shaped 
the wilderness preservation movement in America (c f .  Huth 1972, and Nash 
1982).
The very foundation of the "soul-mood", the void and sole 
conditions of solitude, is the wilderness i t s e l f  - -  the In te r io r . The 
In te r io r  theme of solitude is associated with the idea of space: The
notion of a lonely, unfrequented, or uninhabited place, that is a 
solitude or solitudes in a metonymical usage where solitude (or 
solitudes) is (are) used f ig u ra t iv e ly .  In this case the name of a thing 
is based upon that which is attributed to i t  in association. Ergo, 
wilderness is labeled solitude or solitudes, thereby representing a 
place of solitude or "soul-mood." The emphasis in this case is based 
upon the physical environment and the presence of natural conditions, 
e .g . , w i ld l i f e ,  awesome material manifestions, physical forces (such as 
negative ions) present near w aterfalls  or at high elevation and 
essential wildness ( i . e . ,  the motive force of creation). Furthermore, 
the In te r io r  (the wilderness) is the focal point fo r the "soul-mood."
We are impelled to go to the In te r io r  to find the in te r io r  - -  i . e . ,  the 
sp ir itu a l in te r io r  (of s e lf )  is a re flection of the physical in te r io r
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(of wilderness). In many cases, this condition of solitude also 
includes a human valuation of wilderness, such as opportunities for  
environmental screening in seclusion, and environmental spaciousness for  
loneliness, "soul-mood", etc. which re f le c t  sensory perceptions of the 
landscape. A deeper more underlying theme connected with the In te r io r  
condition of solitude is that of wild creature solitude (the r igh t and 
opportunity fo r wild animals - -  w i ld l i fe ,  plants, and landscapes - -  
wildlands — to be alone, undisturbed and free of human influence, 
presence, interference, control and dominance). In essence the In te r io r  
must be free from management i f  i t  is to re f le c t  the true nature of the 
land. I t  is from th is  In te r io r  sense of solitude that both the void and 
sole conditions are generated and responsible for the "soul-mood."
That one can find solitude in a closet (c f .  Prologue) appears to be 
a misunderstanding of the r e a l i ty  of wilderness as source, the In te r io r . 
This conception of sensory deprivation (tha t is ,  cloistered in a closet) 
is representative of a fundamental error in the way in which solitude is 
defined. Moreover, the root sol is the primal condition for the 
solitude compound. That solus might be the basis of origin for the word 
solitude is an error of etymological scholarship. Moreover, solus is 
not a prime word in that i t  can be reduced to sol and -lus indicating a 
condition of being alone or solo (2 ) .  This condition is perhaps 
associated with the "soul-mood," but very d if fe re n t in i ts  loneliness. 
Figure 2 indicates how this solitude theme d iffe rs  from those of the 
"soul-mood" cosmology. There are, however, basic qualities  of the solus 
or so lita ry  being which work to e ffec t the "soul-mood" condition.
SOLUS SOLITUDE
(Alone) ("Soul-Mood")
I
VACUUM DOMICILIUM
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Indeed, in the notion of iso la tion , we can observe a connection with the 
"soul-mood." The term isolation derives " in -s o l-s ta te ,"  which is a 
condition much l ik e  the "soul-mood." With proper teaching, meditation 
and other religious observation i t  is possible to create this isolation  
within environments other than the wilderness In te r io r , however, 
improper balancing of the relationship between the human controlled, 
dominated environment and the wilderness or w ill-o f-the-1and serve to 
generate a diminishing of both nature and the Principle of nature which 
are essential to the "soul-mood."
This kind of disruption of the relationship between human w il l  and 
the w ill-o f-the-1and results in the short-sighted perspective which 
characterized European invaders of North America and th e ir  policies fo r  
disinheriting the Native Americans. Moreover, the New England Puritans, 
for example, develop a solitude theme based upon development of the 
land. This theme is an invasion policy and is known as vacuum
domiciliurn (2) or "without human habitation." Moreover, the land is
thought to be lonely or desolate i f  i t  is without c iv i l iz a t io n  and 
permanent human occupation. Hence, this is the theme for loneliness of 
place(s) in terms of human valuation. Such lands might be judged upon
the u t i l i t a r ia n  mode of how well they serve humans. Hence, value is
determined upon the nearness of habitation versus remoteness from 
c iv i l iz a t io n .  Vacuum domiciliurn, in theme, is an anthropocentric 
solitude model whereby the value of a landscape is determined via its  
human social worth as i t  favors the in tr in s ic  value of c iv i l iz a t io n .
This is a fa r  cry from the primal concept of "soul-mood" and communion
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with the w ill-o f-the-1and .
In summary, the concept of solitude has entered English from the 
Romance languages (s p e c if ica lly  French and Latin ). The subsequent 
translation has produced two d is tinc tive  conceptions — (1) solus, 
(alone) and (2) "soul-mood." In the f i r s t  case, solus represents the 
solitar iness , seclusion and loneliness of l i f e  removed from others. A 
corollary of the solus conception is the vacuum domiciliurn where the 
absence of human works - -  habitations, developments, "improvements" - -  
implies a diminished valuation of the land due to its  lack of 
usefulness for human u t i l ita r ian ism  - -  i . e . ,  the maximization of human 
happiness and pleasure. This dimension of solitude has been used as a 
basis fo r d isinheriting a people of the land to which they belong (3 ) .
In the second case — "soul-mood" —  solitude is a reckoning of our 
creatureliness, that is our manner of being in the world with others who 
are likewise present. That we could seclude ourselves from the presence 
of others — or remove ourselves into so lita ry  aloneness — is a denial 
of re a l i ty  and an assertion of anthropocentrism. Moreover, there is no 
aloneness in the wilderness, present therein are the vast manifold array 
of Being i t s e l f .  In wilderness, we are crowded in re lation with l i f e  
and the creative process which is w ild , ongoing and ever-active a ll  
about one. Thus, solitude cannot be an escapist re treat from others but 
rather a communion of our creatureliness in sharing empathy with the 
w ill-o f-the-1and . Hence, Wilderness Solitude is not escapism from 
others; i t  is communion with others, which is the acknowledgement of 
soul - -  sol - -  and the creative l i f e  force. The creative l i f e  force
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that is the genesis of wildness which we a l l  share in our very being, a 
being which is at the pleasure of the earth-sun logos of relationship.
Henry Bugbee (1974:6) explains this fellow creatureliness and our 
partic ipation in the world as an ultimate claim of solitude and he 
(1974:10) contends that
The essence of solitude is the purifying and covenanting of 
the heart in readiness to receive beings in this fashion, and to 
respond to them and with them concordantly.
This essence of solitude is fundamentally soul-purity and covenant 
of the heart; i t  is the quest for the grail which the Arthurian knights 
seek. In confronting the edge of w ith in , Arthur asks,
"Have you found the secret I  have lost?" 
and Perceval responds:
"You and the land are one." (Boorman 1981)
I t  is in Wilderness Solitude that we empathize with the 
w ill-o f-the-1and , and this condition is a wildness atonement — a 
oneness with creation.
CHAPTER I I I
WILL.-OF-THE-LAND: Wilderness Among Early Indo-Europeans*
Nature's object in making animals and plants might 
possibly be f i r s t  of a l l  the happiness of each one of 
them, not the creation of a l l  fo r  the happiness of one.
Why ought man to value himself as more than an in f in i te ly  
small composing unit of the one great unit of 
creation?... The universe would be incomplete without 
man; but i t  would also be incomplete without the smallest 
transmicroscopic creature that dwells beyond our 
conceitful eyes and knowledge.
John Muir 1916
When the Scottish born John Muir embraced the wilderness movement
in America, he was answering the call of his race. Muir and the
Scottish peoples are members of the C elto -lingu is tic  group of the 
Indo-European race. The ancient Celts worshipped Nature. Their's was a 
sp ir itua l trad it io n  born of "Nature Awe." For them Nature was a live  - -  
nature sp ir its  animated springs, r iv e rs , forests, and mountains - -  with 
the same creative l i f e  force that humans share. The Celtic  conception 
of Will Power was extended wholly to nature — in i ts  en tire ty  — both 
the animate and the inanimate were recognized to have a compelling 
w il l - fo rc e  "akin to that which impelled man... Even stationary nature 
— the everlasting h i l ls  and the solid earth — was endowed with
fee ling , w i l l ,  and thought. A ll the mental powers that man found
*Presented October 1983 at the 3rd World Wilderness Congress, 
Inverness, Scotland. Forthcoming in Congress Procedings.
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controlling his actions were unconsciously transferred to nature." 
(MacBain 1977) (1)
In writing of his Scottish boyhood and his fondness for "everything 
that was w i ld . . ."  (Teale 1954), John Muir demonstrates a cultural 
predilection favoring this w i l l - fo rc e . This ancient Celtic  notion of 
"w ill"  and w il l - fo rc e  is in origin akin to the term wild. Wilderness 
historian Roderick Nash (1982) te l ls  us that "Etymologically, the term 
[wilderness] means 'w ild-deor-ness,'" the place of wild beasts. Nash 
argues that cognitive terms - -  "wild" and "wildern" - -  present an image 
of an environment alien to humans which is outside of c iv i l iz a t io n 's  
order. In this account, Nash does not develop a deeper etymological 
derivation for wilderness.
Nash makes i t  clear that "the root seems to have been 'w i l l '  with a 
descriptive meaning of s e lf -w il le d ,  w i l l f u l ,  or uncontrollable. From 
'w il led ' came the adjective 'w ild ' used to convey the idea of being 
lo s t ,  unruly, disordered, or confused." Recognizing "w ill"  or "willed" 
as the root fo r  w ild , Nash focuses upon the Old English term "deor" 
(animal or deer) stating that i t  "was prefixed with wild to denote 
creatures not under the control of man." While this may be correct for  
the selected wild derivatives — "wilder" and "wildern" — i t  f a i ls  to 
deal adequately with the "ness" s u ff ix . "Ness" is likewise a term 
derived from Old Gothonic languages. I t  is found in Old Norse, Swedish, 
Danish and low German in various forms. I t  appears in Old English as 
"nass". The Oxford English Dictionary explains that la te r  in Middle 
English i t  was "apparently retained only in place-names, from which the 
la te r  use is probably d er ived ..."  and that the variant "ness may be due
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e ither to the understressed position in place-names, to d ia lect  
varia tion , or to Scandianivian influence." This usage may explain the 
deceptiveness of the term wilderness to which Nash alludes in Wilderness 
and the American Mind. He explains that the "ness" suggests a quality  
"that produces a certain mood or feeling in a given individual and, as a 
consequence, may be assigned by that person to a specific place."
A "ness" is defined as "a promontory headland, or cape" (OED) . 
Walter Skeat (1980) concurs with this d e fin it io n , explaining that the 
term was preserved in place-names— e .g . , Tot-ness and Sheerness. We 
also see i t  preserved in Scotland — Inverness and Loch Ness — both of 
which are areas that came under Scandinivian or Viking influence. Skeat 
further explains that in Anglo-Saxon, "ness" appears as "naes" or "nes" 
and is defined f i r s t  as "the ground"; secondly as "a promontory, 
headland, as in Beowulf..." The promontory de fin it ion  indicates a 
prominence of land or a prominent mass of land which is consistent with 
contemporary wilderness defin it ions . Thus, in recognizing the Middle 
English application of "ness" to place-names, i t  may well have been 
combined with wild in an en tire ly  d if fe ren t sense of meaning than which 
Nash suggests.
Wildness then means "self-w illed-land" or "self-w illed-place" with 
an emphasis upon its  own in tr in s ic  v o li t io n . The middle syllable "der" 
of wilderness possibly represents the preposition-artic le  combination 
"of the". Hence, in wil-der-ness, there is a "w ill-of-the-1and"; and in 
wildeor, there is "will of the animal." A wild animal is a "se lf-w illed  
animal" — an undomesticated animal - -  s im ila r ly , wildland is 
"se lf-w illed  land". In both cases the w i l l ,  w i l l f u l ,  uncontrollable
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state or elements are maximized. This "willed" conception is i t s e l f  in 
opposition with the controlled and ordered environment which is 
characteristic  of the notion of c iv i l iz a t io n .  While control, order, 
domination and management are true of c iv i l iz a t io n  and domestication, 
they are not essentials to wild culture. Culture in this sense 
represents the Celts' social organization, rather than the c ity -s ta te  
concept of c iv i l i z a t io n . (2) The primal peoples of northern Europe were 
not bent upon dominating and controlling a ll  environments. Thus, th e ir  
"w ill-o f-the -land" conception — wilderness - -  demonstrates a 
recognition of land for i t s e l f .
The animistic and the animatistic concepts of nature s p ir i t  or 
s p ir its  of nature are themselves recognitions of the w i l l  inherent 
in nature. Such religious beliefs are often labeled pagan and 
"prim itive". But to understand Muir's wilderness convictions and our 
culture 's deepest roots of wilderness preservation, we must examine our 
ancient Indo-European heritage. Nature worship among primal 
Indo-Europeans evidences a trad it io na l theme of sacred natural places, 
free from desecration by humans and th e ir  technology. Such sacred 
natural places were wilderness in the deepest sense; they were imbued 
with w i l l - fo rc e , - -  w il le d , w i l l f u l ,  uncontrollable - -  and with s p ir i t .  
Thus, they held about them a scared mystery - -  a numinous presence. I t  
is from this trad ition  that the "w ill-o f-the-land" - -  wilderness — 
concept emerges.
Among ancient Indo-European cultures there are many examples of 
wild sanctuaries. There was a "tree of the tribe" and a "love of 
country" (Keary 1882). In an a r t ic le  on "Tree Worship", John Taylor
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(1979) describes Indo-European Oak worship which began with the 
appearance of forest-environments following the las t g laciation. "In a 
purely animistic s tra in , the early Greeks believed the oak to be 
inhabited by a resident e n t ity ,  the nymph or hamadryad." The Greek 
temenos was a sacred precinct beneath the branches of the oak. Sacred 
oak groves among the I t a l i c  peoples were inhabited by a sacred numen. 
Celtic  and Gothonic peoples believed that humankind was born from 
elements of the oak, that the oak was an instrument of d ivination. The 
notion of a "World Tree" is found among both the Celts and the Goths. 
Ward Rutherford (1978) explains that "The 'World Tree' was a centre of 
gathering where the D ru ids... met to pass judgment and to make th e ir  
most solemn decisions. This assembly, no doubt i t s e l f  held under 
t r e e s . . .  demonstrates the sacred role of trees in the Celtic  culture."
The B altic -S lav ic  peoples maintained an early animistic notion 
centered upon a force called s ie la  - -  c f .  I t a l i c  anima, Greek pneuma, 
and Estonian usund. These silvan s p ir its  guarded the forest; they would 
not allow people to whistle or to shout there. They also protected 
animals, p art icu larly  the bear. Furthermore, Taylor explains that "Upon 
the death of an individual his s p ir i t  would be reincarnated most 
frequently into trees." The non-Indo-European, Finno-Ugric [Estonian] 
peoples also practiced an oak veneration. Trees were recognized to have 
a soul or s p ir i t  - -  o r t . The tree was perceived prosperous while the 
ort was within i t ;  they withered and died when i t  moved away. Improper 
behavior — shouts, songs, and noise — could drive the ort away. Thus, 
a tree cu lt  developed, in order to maintain fr iendly  communication and 
mutual respect between humans and trees. "This special form of contact
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was a pledge of friendship; o r ig in a lly  i t  was represented by something 
concrete [g ra n it ic ]  such as a band made of straw, branches, hides, 
belts , flowers, ears of grain, and in general of anything that contained 
'powers'." A tangible pact with the ort by v is ib ly  tying the pledge 
around the tree was thus consummated. A chant fo r this practice might 
go: "I am offering something to you, so that you w ill  o ffe r  something
to me in return." This custom served to assure a peaceful pact between 
the ort and the human (Holmberg 1927 & Paulson 1971). Taylor contends 
that "veneration of the oak continued among the northern Europeans until 
th e ir  sacred oaks l i t e r a l l y  came under the proverial axe of the 
Christians."
Among the Celts, the temenos — sacred precinct or consecrated 
place - -  extended to sacred groves known as nemetons. These wilderness 
sanctuaries were located deep within the forest, and the people made 
long arduous pilgrimages to them in order to worship. The word nemeton 
contains the root nem, related to Breton nemu or "the heavens" in the 
sense of the Other World (paradise on Earth). A ton is a place, hence 
nemu + ton yields Heaven place. This conception of nemeton is 
consistent with Celtic  mythology.. The Celts maintained that form 
manifests motive force and both are merely two facets of a whole — the 
Other World is rea lly  this world but is concerned with the natural is of 
the natura (c f .  Chapter IV ) .  The symbolic proof of this ecological 
hierophany is demonstrated by the well-known Celtic  myth where two 
flocks of sheep, one white, the other black, are grazing on opposite 
sides of a r iv e r .  When a white sheep enters the water and emerges on 
the other side, i t  appears black and conversely, a black sheep emerges
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white upon crossing the stream (Markale 1978). Furthering this  
cosmological doctrine of Nature Awe, sacred groves - -  nemetons - -  were 
regarded among the Celts as a "piece of heaven on e a r th . . ."(Markale 
1977).
HEATHEN, HEATHENISM, HEATH 
Heathen is a word common to a l l  Gothonic languages, and is used in 
the sense 'non-Christian pagan1. This usage demonstrates that i t  could 
only have arisen with the introduction of C h ris tian ity . A d irect  
derivative of the Gothic h a ip i , heath - -  as in 'dweller on the heath1 - -  
heathen re flects  the primal religious practices of northern Europeans. 
Heathenism is defined as "the religious or moral system of heathens; 
heathen practice or b e l ie f ;  paganism." (OED) The term pagan derives 
from paganus which o r ig in a lly  meant a v i l la g e r  - -  rural or rustic  
person. Furthermore, as "Christian ity  became the re lig ion of the 
towns," those persons of rural d is tr ic ts  which retained "the ancient 
deities" became known as "pagan heathens." The impetus of these primal 
traditions - -  heathenism - -  becomes clear upon investigating the word 
heath. Characterized by the heather, this Gothonic term means "Open 
uncultivated ground; an extensive trac t of waste land; a w ilderness..."  
The term moor is a common synomyn; less common are glade and grove. 
Northern Europeans worshipped on the heath, or in the grove - -  that is ,  
in the wilderness. The sp ir itu a l leaders — Druids among the Celts — 
spent much of th e ir  time on the heath, in the groves, thus, in the 
wilderness. This practice interprets the Christian introduction of 
h a ip i; 'dweller on the heath'.
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In consequence, a heathen is one who worships upon the heath — 
moor, glade, grove, wild waste or wilderness. Heathenism is thus the 
re lig ion of wilderness — Nature Worship. Further demonstrating this  
conclusion are the remarks of the classical w rite r  Gildas (c.560) who 
refused to enumerate the "diabolical" customs of the primal culture, 
stating , "Nor w i l l  I call out upon the mountains, fountains, or upon 
r iv e rs , which now are subservient to the use of men, but once were an 
abomination and destruction to them, and to which the blind people paid 
divine honour." (MacBain 1977)
Nemetons were wilderness sanctuaries where Nature Worship occurred. 
The sacred grove was unmodified and i t  continued in its  wild — w il le d ,  
w i l l f u l ,  uncontrollable — condition. Thus, the w i l l -o f - th e - la n d , i ts  
s p i r i t ,  i ts  sacred numinous character manifested i t s e l f .  The land was 
holy and the wild conditioned the s p ir i tu a l ,  sacred experience imbuing 
the people with a sense of the sublime and the numen. According to 
Keary (1882), this "early" connection with the land is a form "of 
intimacy with those fa r -o f f  branches of the tree or with that unsearched 
mountain summit which were then his heaven." Among the Celts, nemetons 
— sacred groves — continued until replace with temples as a result of 
the "overpowering Roman influence" (MacCulloch 1948).
In Gothonic languages the words fo r  "place of worship" or "temple" 
often had the meaning "grove". Demonstrating th is ,  "The Old High German 
harug is rendered in Latin as fanum, Lucas, nemus and the Old English 
hearg, commonly used for 'temple' or ' i d o l ' ,  had the meaning 
'g ro v e ' ." - -c f .  Old English bearu ( ' fo r e s t ,  holy grave, temple') and 
Gothic alhs - -  temple, 'holy grove' (T urv il le -pe tre  1964). Likewise,
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Scandinavian re lig ion was practiced in sacred precincts or groves known
as irminsuls (MacCulloch 1948).
Religion — Uskumus - -  among the Estonians was practiced in the
forest. These Finno-Urgic peoples perceived the forest
to be a l iv in g , fee ling , knowing, desiring, functioning 
en tity  which exercised a decisive influence on human 
beings within i ts  domain... Upon entering i t  the v is ito r  
had to greet the forest p o lite ly  so that he would be 
guarded and protected against a l l  dangers and 
misfortunes, and so that his wishes to obtain game, 
berries, mushrooms, e tc . ,  would be granted. [When 
proper respect was not shown] The forest could cause man 
to lose his way in i ts  th icket, 'to  hide in the fo re s t ' .
I f  he did not behave correctly , that is ,  i f  in thought, 
word or deed he offended, destroyed or spoiled the 
fo res t, i ts  plants, trees, animals, and birds, the forest  
could do him harm by causing him various illnesses, or 
le t t in g  the bear k i l l  him, wolves tear at him, or snakes 
bite  him. (Paulson 1971)
Keary (1882), concurs with these conceptions of wilderness
behavior. He explains that the nature worship of Indo-Europeans
"honoured the sacred silence which reigns about the grove."
These sacred groves were periodically  the s ite  fo r  community
worship — p articu larly  during the earth festiva l days. For example,
among the Celts, the Beltane (May-day), Samain (Hallowe'en), etc. When
these earth festiva ls  were discontinued, in most instances as the result
of compulsion by imperial force, the primal culture disintegrated.
Rutherford (1978) explains tha t,
I f  we can detect a moment at which such change begins, i t  
surely must be that at which urbanization begins and 'the 
c ity '  in the true sense — as a machine for l iv in g  in — 
emerges as centre. This with its  communalized services 
brings men into a real interdependence with each other, a 
t ru ly  in stitu tion a lized  l i f e  begins. But there is also a 
practical point involved, too: the concentration of
population into a smaller area means they w ill  expect to 
conduct worship within that area; they w il l  no longer be
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prepared to make pilgrimages into the heart of the 
countryside. They are now the centre; formerly i t  was 
the religious sanctuary, the nemeton, drawing families to 
worship in i t  from over a wide area.
Demonstrating a non-anthropocentric perspective, the Breton war 
leader Brennus (c .290 Before Present Era) conquered Delphi and "laughed 
aloud on entering a temple to see that the Greeks represented th e ir  gods 
in human form." (Markale 1978) The Celts c learly  disliked human 
representations of d iv in it ie s ,  preferring Nature in i ts  "wild" — 
w ille d , w i l l f u l ,  uncontrollable - -  condition as manifested in the 
nemeton — wilderness sanctuary.
Furthermore, i t  was in these nemetons — sacred groves — where the 
Druids learned th e ir  lore and developed the ir  wisdom. This wisdom of 
the s p ir its  of wood and stream, lea f  and flower, is the foundation of 
the kinship union betweem humanity and wild nature. This ancient wisdom 
constituted Druidic ecological ethics. Glimmerings of these Druidic 
wilderness ethics may be gleamed from the Arthurian legend. The 
archetypical Druid, Merlin, explains to Arthur, what i t  means to be 
King. "You w il l  be the land and the land w il l  be you, i f  you fa i l  the
land w il l  perish, as you th r iv e , the land w il l  blossom." Thus, kinship
with land and its  continued health are central themes of the Celtic  
worldview.
True to this Celtic  heritage, John Muir devoted himself to wilder­
ness. He practiced this heathenism in ways which the more domesticated 
could not understand. When Emerson v is ited Yosemite, Muir implored him 
writing:
Do not thus d r i f t  away with the mob while the s p ir its  of
these rocks and waters hail you a f te r  long waiting as
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th e ir  kinsman and persuade you to closer communion  I
invite  you to jo in  me in a month’ s worship with Nature in 
the high temples of the great Sierra Crown beyond our 
holy Yosemite. I t  w il l  cost you nothing save the time 
and very l i t t l e  of that for you w ill  be mostly in
e te rn ity   In the name of a hundred cascades that
barbarous v is itors  never s e e . . . in  the name of a l l  the 
s p ir i t  creatures of these rocks and of this whole sp ir­
itua l atmosphere Do not leave us now. With most cordial 
regards I am yours in Nature, John Muir. (1916)
Dwelling on the Sierra heaths and moors, John Muir rediscovered the
primal mind — the ancient wisdom. And in that wild beauty and
sweetness which is the primal mind, Muir lived his name. For you
see in Scotland, the d ia lect variation for moor — wilderness - -  is
muir.
CHAPTER IV
KITCHI MANITOU: "Great Mysterious" and Wildness*
Introduction
To suggest that the concepts of wildness and Kitchi Manitou —
"Great Mysterious" — are related, may at f i r s t  glance appear profane. 
Clearly Kitchi Manitou is a sacred concept among the Algonkian related  
peoples. Conversely, the adjective "wildness" has come to describe a 
kind of morally void behavior or depraved condition. Such a de fin it ion  
has, however not always been germaine for th is  concept. Thus the 
profane quality  ascribed to wildness appears as a vulgarism of 
modernity.
Both concepts — "wildness"8and Kitchi M anitou— imply "Great 
Mysterious" and sacred re a l i ty  in princip le . This cosmology is grounded 
in the ecological hierophany characterized by the natural is of naturata 
— that is the natural of nature — which is i t s e l f  p rinc ipa l, that 
which manifests i t s e l f  as nature, and Princip le , that which creates as 
natural. We may, however, f a i l  to understand th is  cosmology due to our 
modern lingu is tics  which exhibit a preoccupation with nominal objec­
t i v i t y .  This philological nominalism of our modern languages accen­
tuates the primacy of nouns as objects. Hence, our present-day 
l ingu is tics  are fundamentally noun or object central. Consequently, the
♦This chapter was presented April 28, 1984 at the Northwest Regional 
Meeting of the American Academy of Religions Conference, Missoula: 
University of Montana.
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subject is the central object while predicate influence is minimized to 
modifying the object complement. Verbs, which are central to re la ­
tionships, are there by reduced in th e ir  significance. As a resu lt,  
relationships are diminished in th e ir  meaningfulness. Furthermore, 
adjectives and adverbs are restricted to nominal f in itu d e , a condition 
which res tr ic ts  an active understanding of r e a l i ty .  The very structure 
of our modern languages, therefore conspire against an understanding of 
the primal outlook. We are today consumed with subject-predicate 
dualism and the nominalization of power. This condition may be termed 
nominalizationism. Moreover, in the nominalization process, power beco­
mes authority, p art icu larly  in social hierarchy. Subsequently, you have 
class structure and epithets for the bourgousie e l i t e  — e .g . ,  S ir  
George, Lord Mountbatten, 'Your Royal Highness', 'His Majesty, the 
King', and 'Mr. President.' Inherent to th is  structure are enormous 
hidden costs which greatly impair an egalitarian  ethos and further in h i­
b i t  ecologically centered heirophanies. Modern cosmologies based upon 
th is  lingu is tic  orientation are seriously handicapped in th e ir  compre­
hension of re a l i ty  because of our contemporary desire to reduce the 
sacred into a singular abstract universal t o ta l i t y  (c f .  the nominalism 
discussion forthcoming). This impoverishment of language forces us to 
look upon the qualitativeness of religious conceptualizations with skep­
tic ism . Why? Because the cosmologies of the re lig iously  devout have 
become froth with nominalizationism and its  subsequent analytical objec­
t i v i t y .  We, resultantly seek sc ien tis tic  proof in understanding a ll  
manifestations of re a l i ty  which is i t s e l f  the practice of nominaliza­
tionism. This practice of sc ien tis tic  skepticism and nominalization is
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blatant reductionism.
META-REDUCTIONISM
Reductionism is "any doctrine that claims to reduce the apparently more 
sophisticated and complex to the less so. (Flew 1984:301) Traditional 
reductionism has a two fold logic: (1) s c ie n t if ic  and (2) beha­
v io r is t ic .  S c ien tif ic  reductionism is m aterially  oriented and comprises 
the search for ind iv is ib le  partic les — atoms (Greek for 'that which 
cannot be c u t ' ) .  I t  is also a kind of reduction of mind to molecules. 
Hence, the second sense of reductionism is re flec tive  of the f i r s t  in 
behavioristic orientation. Behavioristic reductionism is largely fo r ­
mulated around the in terpreta tive  reduction of human behavior to that of 
"lesser" animals. This is a human value laden projection of " in fe r io r  
knowledge" upon non-human beings. Meta-reductionism is an overarching, 
a l l  encompassing endeavor based upon anthropocentricism — man as the 
central value of the universe (c f .  note 1, chapter I ) .  In contrast to 
trad it io na l reductionism, meta-reductionism is applied in inverse 
process. The logic of meta-reductionism is (A) nominalizationism, (B) 
nominalism and (C) supernaturalism.
Nominalizationism(A) provides the point of departure into the meta- 
reductionary process (c f .  Introduction). In i ts  nominalization of 
power, nominalizationism(A) "paves" the way for nominalism(B).
Nominalism posits a "view that universals have no existence indepen­
dently of being thought and are mere names, representing nothing that 
rea lly  ex ists. The nominalist thus denies anything l ik e  Plato's theory 
of Forms or Ideas." (Flew 1984:250) In the process of nominalism, names
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are given to powers. These are in turn ontologized into particu lar  
beings which subsequently are de-ontologized into abstract universals. 
God as an anthropomorphism serves to demonstrate this process of nomina­
lism. Moreover, f i r s t  there is the recognition of form (principa l)  
which is in turn named and nominalized into being — in th is  case man 
into God. This process constitutes nominalistic anthropomorphism. Next 
God becomes an abstract universal, that is God Almighty in the sense of 
a de-ontological framework, thereby representing Principle in separation 
from principal. In meta-reductionary logic , nominalism(B) is followed 
by supernaturalism(C) which projects human values in super-transcendance 
onto the sacred. Philosophers define the supernatural as "that which 
surpasses the active and exactive powers of nature — or that which 
natural causes can neither avail to produce nor require from God as the 
complement of th e ir  kind. (Guthrie in Runes 1960:307) This philosophy 
establishes a dichotomy between the natural and the supernatural. Given 
th is  problem, we need an analysis of the term supernatural. The 
substantive "natural" is derivative from the Latin natural is (of 
nature), therefore based upon the naturata (nature). Hence the nature 
of nature hierophany previously alluded to . "Nature" represents the 
inherent character and the basic constitution of "what is": I t  is thus
an essence and a disposition at once. The nature of nature is thus the 
Principle of principal. "Nature" is ,  therefore the world — the cosmos 
— in its  en tire ty . The prefix  "super" connotes that which is over and 
above; i t  is conceded to that which is higher in quantity, q u a lity , or 
degree, thus i t  implies "more than" or "greater than." But what can be
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"more than" or "greater than" nature — which is i ts e l f ,  the world, the 
cosmos in its  entirety? Before pursuing this argument, the conclusion 
of meta-reductionary logic is warranted. Moreover, Supernaturalism(C) 
which projects abstract human values onto "nature" is the nominalism(B) 
at work in the world. Furthermore, nominalism(B) is the product of 
nominalizationism(A) in its treatment of "powers." Thus, the concept of 
the "supernatural" is a clear example of cosmologic meta-reductionism in 
the theory of religion founded upon the nominalizationism of language 
(and world view). I t  is clear that the term "supernatural1 implies 
separation between the natural — which is.grounded in ecologic process 
and biologic reality  — and the sacred which is presented as a super­
transcendence of nature. There are several major problems associated 
with this meta-reductionism and its  super-transcendence of nature.
These d if f ic u lt ies  include profound allegorical misconceptions and a 
meta-reductionist categoreal mistake which serves to impoverish reality  
by making experience fraudulent while producing an abstract absolutist 
dogma.
Meta-reductionism of the ecologic hierophany - -  natural is of 
naturata — produces the allegorical misconception. Moreover, in this 
allegorical error, the principal which is nature as manifest, is dicho­
tomized and dualistically separated via supernatural nominalism from the 
Principle which is the natural is or underlying motive force of the 
naturata — principal. In this disparaging of nature and debasing of 
rea lity , the allegorical misconception is rationalized upon a reduc- 
tionary categorical mistake which rests upon the false dichotomy
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presented as natural versus supernatural.
The complex question of monotheism and its  compulsion for nominali­
zationism provides a basis for understanding the preceding d i f f ic u l t ie s .  
Moreover, in nominal monotheism, God becomes the abstract - -  super- 
naturally  removed — object of religion and represents the to ta l i t y  of 
the sacred in a singular universal. In conceiving the sacred as a 
singular ontological s tate , there is a denial of the manifold d iversity  
of the natural world, which is subsequently the basis for an impo­
verished re a l i ty  where experience is fraudulent (c f .  Jenkins 1942).
Thus in nominal monotheism the sacred is many times removed from the 
naturata and the natural is is separated from earthly a f fa i rs .  But 
because "man" is a l l  edged to be the centrally  most important creation of 
the universe and created in the image of God (anthropomorphically), the 
human species is recognized as quasi-sacred, existing in a profane, 
natural surrounding which is the aftermath of "original s in ."  This 
anthropocentricism is a separation which fosters human narcissism based 
upon the species' id en tif ica tio n  with the ontologically sim ilar God of 
the human personal fa m ilia r . Such is the foundation of superhuman 
desiring and human chauvinism towards non-human nature which is fa lse ly  
perceived, rationalized and ju s t i f ie d  as a "resource" stockpile for 
humanity. Moreover, the natural is excluded from the divine and sub­
sequently viewed as profane and simply a means to an end which is 
"man's" eternal and immortal salvation. Thus the natural-supernatural 
dichotomy of nominal monotheism presents a dilmma for those who would 
sense the sacred in nature. Hence in nominal monotheism, the sacred is
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fundamentally "supernatural" and super-transcendent of natural law — 
i . e . ,  ecological process and biological re a l i ty  which are fa lse ly  per­
ceived as profane conditions. The results from th is  perspective are 
separation of principal - -  the naturata - -  from Principle - -  the natura- 
l i s . Super-transcendence makes principal unnecessary and in no longer 
having princ ipa l, the separated Principle is destroyed. Moreover, 
Principle is dead because of the lack of a referant - -  i . e . ,  p rincipal.
The fau lty  logic of this meta-reductionary process - -  a llegorical 
error and categoreal mistake — is evidenced in the experiential con­
ditions of nature. Moreover, that which can be experienced is by d e f i­
nition natural. Hence, the supernatural is an impossible category, the 
product of Western meta-reductionism. The supernatural exists only 
within the abstraction of allegorical misconception. That is to say, in 
our place among the cosmos, we exist in the natural world, and therefore 
we can only experience the sacred through the natural. The natural is 
thus the foundation for a l l  that is sacred, heretofore the supernatural. 
We are natural beings in a cosmic perspective where there is no super­
transcendence of nature because what is must be natural. Thus i t  is 
merely our modern unfam iliarity  with the ecological hierophany — 
natural is of naturata - -  which is the basis for this meta-reductionary 
categoreal mistake of nominal supernatural ism.
Supernaturalism becomes a central focus for absolutist dogmatism in 
i ts  contention of pervasive supermacy over the natural. The dogma 
herein is that nature is much simpler and barer than i t  appears to us in 
experience. Hence the nominalist view of the sacred results in
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impoverishment of re a l i ty  where experience is fraudulent. As a resu lt ,
v ir tue , beauty, and purpose are not real facts in nature; they 
must, then, result merely from the indiv idual's  reaction to and 
in terpretation of nature. This means that they are real for 
each man only as he feels them, and he is to honor and accept 
no opinion concerning them except his own. Such negation of 
discipline can but culminate in coercive authority; and such 
denial of standards must issue in the doctrine that desire 
measures good and that right is synonymous with power (Jenkins 
1942:546).
In projecting th is  meta-reductionary of the supernatural onto primal 
worldviews, we are committing the absolutist error o f  imperialism.
Meta-reductionism leads us fa r  astray from the primal understanding 
of re a l i ty  where language is rich in the polysynthetic modality inherent 
to the ecological hierophany - -  natural is of naturata. Moreover, the 
primal understanding of sacred re a l i ty  is grounded in the experimental.
In primal cases, sacred re a l i ty  is glimpsed or dreamed, sensed or 
f e l t  in ordinary daily a f fa irs ;  i t  is relational without dichotomy in 
everyday l iv in g . This sensory relational quality  of sacred re a l i ty  
requires a polysynthetic l in g u is t ic  formulation which is at once active  
in disposition, descriptive in expression, and objective in orientation. 
Primal world views, conceive the ecolbgical hierophany — naturalis  of 
naturata — by making distinction between agent -  form, that is prin­
cipal manifest, and motive force which is Principle in transcendence. 
Moreover, underlying the hand you see (principal manifestation) is the 
hand of transcendence (in  P rinc ip le ). This dichotomy of meta- 
reductionism is avoided because the ecological hierophany is seen in 
dynamic relationship without the poss ib ility  of separation. That is to 
say, primal peoples make the distinction between principal and Principle  
without separation. Kitchi Manitou cosmology — i . e . ,  "Great
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Mysterious" - -  w i l l  enlighten th is  naturalis of naturata ecological 
hierophany.
Kitchi Manitou in Perspective
Kitchi Manitou is according to Christopher Vecsey (1983:80) "the 
creation of Christians." This deduction is based upon the translation  
Supreme Being — "Great S p ir i t"  — or "High God."
Certa in ly , Christian missionary influence has had a potent and 
lasting e ffec t .  Often when faced with opposition to or rejection of 
th e ir  theology, Christians have resorted to force as a means of con­
verting non-believers (Frederick Turner 1980 ca lls  th is  practice "the 
Western S p ir i t  Against the Wilderness," c f .  Segal & Stinebeck, 1977 
Puritans, Indians and Manifest Destiny, S lotkin , 1972 Regeneration 
Through Violence; Vest 1984 "Wild Mind, Primal Mind"). That Christian  
missionary e fforts  influenced, subjugated and perverted the Algonkian's 
b e lie f  into a "Great S p ir it"  or Supreme Being is c learly  evident. I t  
may not follow that the term Kitchi Manitou always translated as such. 
Moreover, Vecsey (1983) begins his investigation convinced of the nomi­
nalism of Ojibwa's --Algonkian peoples - -  conceptions of the sacred. 
Vecsey (1983:4) states that for the Ojibwa "the ultimate sources of 
existence were extremely powerful beings called manitos." In this con­
tex t manitos are clearly  supernatural beings or gods. For example, 
Vecsey (1983:4-5) states:
The Ojibwa regarded the manitos as essential prerequisites  
for the continuance of l i f e .  Humans' existence depended 
ultim ately upon th e ir  a b i l i ty  to establish and maintain 
relations with the manitos.
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Ojibwas viewed the manitos as ultimate providers of food 
made available through hunting. Manitos also upheld human 
health and granted medicine in order to secure human 
longevity.
This account implies that Algonkian thought was structured in a 
subject-predicate duality which is characteristic of Western nominaliza­
t i  on ism Vecsey's perspective is one of meta-reductionism. Moreover, 
according to Vecsey (1983) these "supernatural" beings - -  manitos - -  are 
the supreme source of the sacred among the Ojibwa.
The problem with this nominalistic subject-predicate duality and its  
noun-being or ontologic conception of sacred "powers" may be one of 
translation. Could in contradistinction, for example, the Algonkians be 
using the manito, or manitos as agents or principals representing 
Principle? And i f  so, does the "power(s)" reside in the manito(s) —
i . e . ,  in the agent-principal(s) — or in the underlying Principles(s)? 
The more traditional scholarship suggests that a concept of Principle(s) 
is at work in these cases beyond the agent-principal(s) or manito(s) 
which Vecsey asserts. For example, among the Munsee-Mahican Delawares 
- -  Algonkians - -  Frank Speck (1945:40) was told that "the Creator, whose 
name is Pa'tama'was, translated as 'The Being Prayed to . '"  That 
Pa'tama'was is a "Being" at a ll is questionable considering Speck's 
(1945) prefatory remarks for the Delaware Bear Sacrifice Ceremony. 
Moreover, in these remarks, Speck (1945) clears away some of the human 
chauvinistic problems associated with Western meta-reductionism. Speck 
(1945:v i i ) states that the Bear Sacrifice Ceremony of the Delawares is
one of the world's pure nature conceptions of magnitude in 
a small firmament. Its  limitations to the realm of pure nature
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leave no fringe of space for the recognition of a human 
personality. There is no messianic personage, no defied 
revealer, no individual founder of doctrines, no transcendental 
emissary who appeared on earth to teach men the sacred r itu a ls  
of rules of religious conduct. In short, the personified 
attachment of religious performance to creed is to ta l ly  lacking.
Since "human personality" and the narcissism of human chauvinism are
absent from the Delaware cosmology, then i t  would follow that a meta-
reductionary God would likewise be missing. Conversely, the
monotheistic trad itions of the invading Europeans contained a doctrine
"b u ilt  upon mankind as the center of a l l  existence!" (Speck 1945:v i i i )
The subject-object allegory of nominal monotheism works on a basis
of seeing the sacred as a noun or en tity  of being. This standard
monotheistic format presents believers with the notion of a sky-God or
Supreme Being. That Pa'tama'was is a sky-God may re flec t  trad itiona l
Delaware cultural disruption and mis-translation. Moreover, could we
think of Pa'tama'was as "The Principle Prayed to?" Speck (1935:29)
agrees with Vecsey (1983) and others that the b e lie f  in an antropo-
morphic Supreme Being among the Algonkians has i ts  origin in these
✓
peoples' contact with the European monotheists.
Among the Montagnais-Naskapi [Algonkian], who at present 
are subject to c lass ifica tion  as nominal Christians, we find  
the term Tce'mantu, "Great S p ir i t ,"  in common use to denote the 
Christian God. Kantautci ' t u k ' , "Our Creator," and Kantce 
' ta p e lto 'k ,  "Our Great Master or Owner" are also used. (Speck 
1935:29)
Although th is  Tee 'mantu concept cannot be proven to be aboriginal in 
orig in , Speck (1935:29) states, "The impression remains, however, a fte r  
questioning widely among the older men that Tee 'mantu is the author of 
creation; that he is not antropomorphic." Furthermore,
The general opinion prevails among the la i ty  of the bands,
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that Tee 'mantu is a s p ir i t  having neither body nor form, that 
he is creator and controller of the u n ivers e .. . .  Says the 
Mistassini headman: "He is a s p ir i t  (mantu) l ik e  the sun,
moon, and stars, who created everything, including them. As to 
form or body — ah! that is something no one can know because 
no one has ever seen him, The priests! Ah! they do not know 
anymore about that than we ourselves do! They ta lk  about i t ,  
but i t  rests a mystery, for they have not seen him."
Thus, the Tee 'mantu or Kitchi Manitou remains mysterious despite
nominalism. Perhaps upon analysis of the terms involved — i . e . ,  Kitchi
Manitou, — a clearer picture w i l l  emerge.
Among the notions of sacred re a l i ty  present within Algonkian
cultures is the concept of " ‘operate mantu1 (Manitu) 1" which Speck
(1935:8) defines as "a native term the meaning of which we can scarcely
grasp, but which represents something near our notion of unseen force."
Furthermore, th is  "operate mantu1" or "unseen force" thoroughly
permeates "every act in l i f e "  (Speck 1935:9). Speck (1935:26) c la r i f ie s
this  Manitou concept with a "trivium of cosmology, religious practice,
and ethics" which pervade the Labrador - -  Algonkian - -  Indians'
re lig ion . There are:
1. Mantu' (M a'nitu) : The universe, natural law, the unknown, 
s p ir i t - fo rc e s , supreme power.
2. Mantoci'win: "Practice based upon mantu'." Man's relationship  
with nature, magical practice, shamanism (s p ir i t  control, magic 
power in a r t ,  in economic operation), d ivination , soul, or 
"great-man" control.
3. Minoto'tok: "Proper conduct, behavior." Human In terre la t io n ­
ships, eTHTcal princip les, social usages, customs in general.
The background upon which these sacred relationships rest among the
Algonkian peoples must be understood in the term Manitou. Speck
(1935:27) explains that among the Montagnis-Naskapi:
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The term [Manitou] cannot be adequately translated, since 
i t  is an abstraction having no d e fin ite  compass in the genius 
of a vague philosophy. To the native i t  is not, as d i f f i c u l t  a 
thought to grasp as i t  seems to us, for we use the term 'power' 
to think of transcendental q u a lit ie s , whereas he does not.
Everything not understood is implied in i t .  He intends the 
term to have no d e fin ite  application.
In th is  way the term Manitou is free from the nominalization of power,
characteristic  to meta-reductionism, yet loaded with the polysynthetic
descriptiveness necessary to qualify  the sacred "powers." Consequently,
the subject-object dichotomy is absent and is also without influence
upon th is  understanding of the ecological hierophany. Speck (1935:27)
further c la r i f ie s  the Manitou concept explaining:
One informant w i l l  t ry  to i l lu s t r a te  the meaning of the 
term by comparing i t  to natural physical force observable in 
e le c t r ic i ty ,  grav ity , heat, steam, while another w il l  liken i t  
to psychic principles operating in thought, invention, memory, 
co-ordination, in animal generation and human procreation, in 
heredity, and especially in supernatural control. While 
mantu1 cannot be le x ic a lly  defined, we can glean some l i t t l e  
idea of i ts  purport from the extensive use to which i t  is put 
in the sp ir itu a l vocabulary of the people. In the sense of 
's p ir itu a l being* or 'd e ity ' we have glanced at i ts  adaptation 
to Christian miracles of the shaman or conjuror. I t  often 
appears, moreover, in terms expressing mental states which 
result in producing physical e ffects .
Hence, Manitou is a pervasively mysterious princip le . I t  is verbal in 
q u a lity , yet polysynthetic in i ts  combined characteristics of verb-noun- 
adjective. In th is  way Manitou is both an in f in i t iv e  ( c . f .  the la t in  
Gerund) and a pa rt ic ip le  ( c . f .  the Latin Gerundive) - -  i . e . ,  repre­
senting both verbal noun and verbal adjective simultaneously. In modern 
English, the uncanny, incomprehensible adjective "mysterious" best 
represents these q u a lit ie s . Kitchi is Algonkian for "Great"; ergo, 
Kitchi Manitou translates "Great Mysterious" where two adjectives free
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o f  the nominalizing a r t ic le  "the" l in g u is t ic ly  represent a deeply com­
pacted and compounded polysynthesis of verb-noun-adjective, the meaning 
of which we can scarcely grasp. Further demonstrating th is  point of 
trans la tion , the term Manitou may be combined to form abstract thought 
as in the case of m a n tu 'e lte 'lta k1, or 'spirit-power th in k in g ',  as well 
as forming the root for certain animal names — e .g . ,  Mantu'c meaning 
'snake,' 'worm,' and ' in s e c t ';  mantume'kuc ‘ sm elt,1 ‘ s p ir i t  f ish ' (Speck 
1935:28). In this way, the sacred "power" or "principles" are 
acknowledged pervasively throughout the natural order and thereby free 
from meta-reductionism.
Wildness in Principle
In princ ip le , wildness may represent an ancient, primal Indo- 
European counterpart of the Algonkian Manitou concept. Moreover, this  
Gothonic term connotes a "sacred w i l l"  in polysynthetic meaning. The 
"ness" suffix  imparts a landed or earthy quality  and is associated with 
a promontory or headland (c f .  Chapter I I I ) .  When added to nouns, they 
become deceptive l ik e  both an in f in i t iv e  and a pa rt ic ip le  at once. 
Furthermore "ness" is derived from the same root for nose. In this con­
te x t ,  i t  is associated with the breath and animation of s p ir i t .  
Consequently, "ness" imparts a polysynthetic deception when i t  is added 
to substantive nouns. This practice e ffec t ive ly  implies "s p ir i t  of" and 
is thereby a sacred qu a lif ica t io n . For example, our shared humanness 
may le x ic a lly  translate  as the s p ir i t  of humanity, or the human s p ir i t  
condition which we a l l  share as members of the human species. When 
"ness" is added to place names which is i ts  trad it io n  usage (c f .  Chapter
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I I I ) ,  i t  imparts an earth -sp ir it  to the place. Loch-ness, for example, 
is famed for its  "ness" powers which are today meta-reductionistically  
associated with a nominalized monster. The slaying of such monsters and 
dragons which is characteristic of Christian fa iry -ta les  is a mythic 
representation of the earth -sp ir it  power(s) as conquered by the anthro- 
pocentric tradition of Christianity. This explains how the sacred sites 
of pagan heathens were transformed into Christian shrines.
The substantive wild is likewise deceptive. I t  is a contraction of 
w illed , thereby representing a partic ip le  which implies in application a 
volition or a se lf-w illed  condition (c f .  Chapter I I I ) .  This self-w illed  
volition or animistic condition is the basis for the wild state. Hence 
in the term wildness, there emerges concepts of sacred self-willed-land  
or s e lf-w il led -earth -sp ir it  (the term "self" herein is used to construe 
any material entity  — from a rock to a human person). With this poly­
synthetic quality in primal translation, the "willed" of wildness 
requires explication.
Will not only implies animation and vo lit ion , but imparts a logic of 
desire, intention, inclination, disposition, nature and principle. To 
understand the deeper underlying principle at work here, we need to 
b rie f ly  examine this logos of "w il l" . When we say that one desires, we 
imply a conscious craving of wish fu lf i l lm en t. This desirous impulse is 
often considered lustful and thereby connotative of greed. That 
wildland agent-principals can desire is patently absurd and furthermore 
an erroneous assumption which ignores the complex logos of ecologic har­
mony and balance germane to the w ild -earth -sp ir it  context of wildness.
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Intentions suggest a determination or resolve which may be a concentrate 
of desire. Thus, to suggest that wildlands have desires and intentions 
is both a lle g o ric a lly  incorrect and categoreally mistaken. Wildland is ,  
however, possessed with an inclination and disposition to nature and 
princip le . Moreover, i t  is inclined to a principled state as defined by 
nature. The disposition of wildland is c learly  evident in i ts  condition 
of ecologic in terre lationship  - - e .g . ,  some lands are disposed out of 
clim atic factors to be deserts while others are inclined to be rain 
forests. We classify th is  disposition of wildlands into ecosystems, 
thereby referencing th e ir  nature. But what is the essential nature of 
wildness - -  i . e . ,  wildland and w ild -earth -sp ir it?  Let us posit here, 
that l ik e  the Manitou concept, i t  is mysterious in terre lationship  and 
principle  of power(s). Principle denotes o rig in , source, and source of 
action; i t  emphasizes in i t ia l  states and natural tendencies. I t ,  there­
fore, posits motive force. Such must be the pervasive quality  of w ild­
ness which is imbued with the principled maxim of origin and beginnings. 
Thus in sacred princ ip le , wildness must impart creation l ik e  Pa'tama'was 
— i . e . ,  i t  is a fundamental source and basis for the creation of a ll  
that is .  This is no doubt the quick of Thoreau's maxim that "In wildness 
is  the preservation of the world."
CHAPTER V
WILDERNESS WILL and Rationalism
The acknowledgement that wilderness means w i l l -o f - th e  land (c f .  
Chapter I I I ) ,  threatens contemporary anthropocentricism (c f .  Note 1, 
Chapter I ) .  This anthropocentricism is born from the human egoistic  
philosophy of rationalism, which is a subsequent tenet of 
meta-reductionism (c f .  Chapter IV ).  Rationalism is a premise which 
gives rise to a notion of re a l i ty  as universal abstration. Moreover, 
re a l i ty  is viewed as the manifestation of thought. In accepting this  
premise, the wilderness Historian Roderick Nash (1982:5) contends that 
there is a "tendency of wilderness to be a state of mind." Thus "to 
accept as wilderness those places people call wilderness. The emphasis 
here is not so much what wilderness is but what men think i t  is ."  The 
authors of Wilderness Management (Hendee, Stankey & Lucas 1978:9) agree 
and call wilderness "the terra  incognito of people's minds."
Wilderness as a concept of mind bears out the anthropocentric 
management notion which is inherent to "mind over matter" 
ra tiona liza tions . The consequence of this ra tiona liza tion  is the 
categoreal mistake which Nash, Hendee, e t al make in conceiving 
wilderness as a state of mind. Moreover, this conclusion fosters the 
abstract perceptions of matter as the object of mind. Wilderness is 
thus conceived as an a r t i f ic e  of man's mind. The practical results of 
this thinking are managerial notions shaping the w il l -o f-th e - la n d  - -
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hence, wilderness management. This positive is clear upon investigating  
the origins of the term management. Manage, from the Old French 
Menagerie, f i r s t  meant the control of domestic animals, thus, i t  meant 
to handle and was derived from the Latin manus (hand). I t  was, however, 
early influenced by menage which is from Old French mesnage derived from 
the la te  Latin form mansionaticum management of the manison (Shipley, 
79). Thus manage is closely connected to domestic control (c f .  Weekley 
1967: 887). The su ffix  -ment derives from the Latin -mentum which was 
added to verb-stems and generally expressed the result or product of the 
verb's action, fo r  example fragmentum (fragment), but at other times i t  
represented the means or instrument of the action, such as alimentum 
(alim ent). In the Old French adoption of this s u ff ix ,  i t  retained these 
original functions, but came also to represent a formative of active  
nouns. English adopted i t  as a means of formulating words with concrete 
senses, fo r example garment (Oxford English Dictionary 1971: 1770; 341) 
and hence management. I t  is in this concrete sense, that management is 
the working or cu ltivation of the land. In the active senses of the 
verb formative (Old French), management denotes "the action or manner of 
managing" that is ,  "the application of s k i l l  or care in the 
manipulation, use, treatment, or control (of things or persons, or in 
the conduct of an enterprize, operation, e tc .)  [ OED 1971: 1711; 106].
Wilderness management thus implies that we w i l l  manipulate, 
domesticate and control the w i l l -o f - th e - la n d . Wilderness management is 
c learly  a contradiction of terms. A h istorica l note which further bears 
out the irony of this conception - -  wilderness management - -  is the way 
in which Menagerie appeared in Old French. Moreover, Menagerie
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o r ig in a lly  represented the treatment given the chichevache -  a mythical 
creature, destroyed by the c iv i l ize d  world (Shipley, 79). The c iv i l ize d  
world is the epitomy of anthropocentricism. This human chauvinism 
manifests i t s e l f  in the management of wildland for human habitat and 
subsequent recreation. We translate this practice as c iv i l iz a t io n  and 
i ts  policy represents the convenience that emerges from a human desiring 
fo r  a world of order, control and domestication. This desiring 
culminates in a world — c iv i l iz a t io n  - -  desiringly free from the dread 
of not-being which must confront a l l  who are subject to the w i l l -o f - th e -  
land. How can the w il l -o f- th e - la n d  have meaning in such a c iv i l iz e d  
world? How can human — c iv i l iz e d  - -  minds conceive the w i l l -o f - th e -  
land? And how can wilderness exist in this menagerie of mental 
management.
The Mental Management of Wilderness
In order to address these questions, we must investigate the locus 
of this mental management ideology. The modern anthropocentric 
perspective postulates ra t io n a li ty  as the primary requisite of w i l l .
Will is thus steeped with desireful ness and in ten t io n a lity .  Hence w i l l  
is ,  in this case, essentia lly  a tenet of rationalism which is another 
process germaine to meta-reductionism (c f .  Chapter IV ) .  Rationalism 
contends that "truth is not sensory but in te llec tua l and deductive." 
(Bourke in Runes 1960:263) DeCarte's " I th ink, therefore I am" implies 
that a l l  being is dependent upon thought fo r existence. Moreover, in 
this conception, the re a l i ty  of being is based upon the abstraction of 
thought. This perception gives rise to a notion of r e a l i ty  as
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abstraction. I t  is c learly  rationalism in the narrowest sense where 
reason alone provides insight into the nature of what exists. Also, the 
motive force of what exists is provided by the mind.
DeCartes1 rationalism exemplifies nominalism in its  deductive 
character and furthers the logic of meta-reductionism through a b e lie f
that everything is explicable and subserviant to a single system — i . e .
- \
the mind of man. Furthermore, in advancing meta-reductionism, 
rationalism serves anthropocentricism in consigning w il l  to desire and 
in ten tio n a lity . In this way, wildland -  agent principals are 
disenfranchised. The result is to deny wilderness - -  the w i l l  which is 
wildness or the motive force (w i l l - fo rc e ) characteristic  to the 
w ill-o f-th e - la n d  cosmology. Rationalism c learly  adds to 
meta-reductionism by furthering human chauvinistic doctrines which 
impoverish r e a l i ty .  Logically , then, philosophic rationalism acts 
through the psychological process of ra tiona liza tion  to foster the 
anthropocentric desire and in ten tio n a lity  rationales for which human 
dominance and control are characteristic  of wilderness management.
I t  has, however, been posited that the desire and in ten tiona lity  of 
rationalism do not properly re f le c t  the deeper re a l i t ie s  inherent to the 
w ill-o f-th e - lan d  cosmology (c f .  Chaper IV ). Moreover, that the land has 
a w i l1 is more properly a recognition of i ts  own inclinations and 
dispositions — that is ,  the natural is of natura. This insight is an 
acknowledgement of wildness as motive force. I t  is an ecological 
hierophany expressive of many primal peoples' cosmological doctrines. 
This w i ll-o f-th e - la n d  cosmology is based upon a primal quickening - -  an 
insight which distinguishes between principal ( naturata — nature) and
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princip le  ( naturalis  — of nature). Principal is the agent -  form or 
that which m ateria lly  manifests i t s e l f .  I t  is the wilderness as 
physically and m ateria lly  experienced — i . e . ,  the naturata (nature).  
Principle is the underlying agent-of-form or that which generates and 
creates, moreover, i t  is motive force, the natural is (o f nature). 
Principle is thus unseen; i t  is meta-physically and s p ir i tu a l ly  
experienced. There is ,  however, no separation inherent to this  
d is t in c t io n . Principal and Principle are one in th e ir  wholeness. They 
are a sacred t o t a l i t y ,  an ecological hierophany the natural is of 
naturata , and hence, they posit fundamental condition or tru th .
Primal Perspectives on the W ill-of-the-Land
As we have seen (c f .  Chapter IV ) ,  the Algonkian peoples of the 
eastern woodlands acknowledged this uncanny in terre la tionsh ip  as Kitchi 
Manitou ("Great Mysterious"), a term which we today can scarely grasp 
the meaning and importance o f. Many other Native American cosmologies 
likewise acknowledge th is  ecological hierophany of principal and 
Princip le . The Lakota, fo r  example, ca ll th is sacred conception Wakan 
Tanka or "Great Mysterious." Professor Joseph Epes Brown explains that  
Wakan is best translated as mysterious powers as in sacred and that i t  
is la te n t to a l l  forms of the phenomenal world. The Lakota Shaman,
Sword says that
Every object in the world has a s p i r i t  and that s p i r i t  is Wakan. 
Thus, the s p i r i t  of the tree or things of that kind, are also Wakan 
. . .  The earth and the rock and the mountain pertain to the Chief 
Wakan. We do not see the real earth and rock but only th e ir  
tonwami. When a Lakota prays to Wakan Tanka, he prays to the earth 
and to the rocks and a l l  good Wakan beings. (Sword through J. R. 
Walker in Tedlock 1975:207)
Furthermore, Professor Brown explains that throughout the Plains Indian 
cultures, there is an ultimate recognition of the unity of powers - -  the 
in terrelationship of a l l  things or "Wakan beings." These mysterious 
powers in h o lis t ic  in terrelationship - -  Wakan Tanka - -  are "Great 
Mysterious."(1) In both cases - -  Lakota and Algonkian - -  this sacred 
concept is expressed in the in f in i t iv e  mode of two adjectives as opposed 
to the f in i t e  quality  which a noun imparts. The hierophany is i t s e l f  
polysynthetic in formulation. I t  is at once active in disposition, 
descriptive in expression, and objective in orientation. This 
polysynthetic structure augments well with the way in which w i l l  became 
wild in expression of place. Moreover, the adjective wild operates as 
an in f in i t iv e  and when connected with the su ffix  ness, they together 
connote a sacred condition which may make wilderness in principal and 
Principle an Indo-European equivalent fo r "Great Mysterious." (c f .  
Chapter IV ).
This w i ll-o f-th e -la n d  cosmology is a central element of early  
Indo-European re lig ion . These primal peoples acknowledge the ecological 
heirophany of wilderness in th e ir  daily  l ive s . For example, the ancient 
Celtic conception w i l l - fo rc e , is explained by MacBain (1917) to be 
creative l i f e  force animating being. All of nature, both "animate" and 
"inanimate," was conceived to be compelled by a wi11 fulness and existed 
in a s e lf -w il le d  condition.(2) This perspective obligated the people to 
observe the "sacred silence" of the nemeton or wilderness sanctuary.
The Celts recognized s p ir its  and souls everywhere — in ancient trees, 
weird rocks, and in rivers and bogs. This acknowledgement of the land 
for i t s e l f  in material manifestation — principal - -  and again in
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pervasive w il l - fo rc e  or meta-physical Principle constituted the 
ecological heirophany of wilderness. Celtic  mythology is f i l l e d  with 
these weird relational q u a lit ie s . The term weird is most appropriate 
for expressing this cosmology. Primarily a Scottish word in o r ig in ,  
thus hinting Celtic  roots, weird is associated with w i l l  or agency of 
powers. (OED 1971: 3731;272-273) Furthermore, weird connotes magical 
powers and enchantment, such as the "wilderness experience" generates.
Many other primal religious trad it io n s , likewise, share in this  
cosmological perspective of wilderness. For example, the "Shin" of 
Japanese Shinto denotes "nature s p i r i t " and there is no separation 
between the universe and Divine S p ir i t .  The Chinese Tao or "Way" is 
another acknowledgement of the ecological hierophany of wilderness. 
Taoism is based upon a natural unity and rythmn which is pervasive 
throughout the universe. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1976:85-86) explains:
I t  is of cardinal importance that the Tao is both the 
Principle , the way to a tta in  the Principle and also the order of 
things. I t  is in fact the order of nature i f  we remember a l l  that 
Taoism means by nature. Tao, the Principle that is also the order 
and harmony of a l l  things, is everywhere present, in everything 
that is great, or small. "The Tao does not exhaust i t s e l f  in what 
is greatest nor is i t  ever about from what is least; and therefore, 
i t  i»s to be found complete and difused in a l l  things." . . . the 
Tao . . . pervades a l l  things and also transcends a l l  things.
[Hence] To be happy with nature means precisely to accept its  
norms and its  rhythmns rather than to seek to dominate and overcome 
i t .  Nature should not be judged according to human u t i l i t y  nor 
earthly man made the measure of a l l  things. There is no 
anthropomorphism connected with man's relations with nature. Man 
should accept and follow the nature of things and not seek to 
disturb nature by a r t i f i c ia l  means. Perfect action is to act 
without s e lf - in te re s t  and attachment, or, in other words, according 
to nature which acts free ly  and without greed, lust or other 
u lte r io r  motives.
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The way is in e ffec t the w i l l-o f-th e - lan d  and i t  acts desire lessly , free  
from in ten tio n a lity .
In Zen Buddism, the concept of one mind, one body is universal.
This conceptualization provides a means for nature veneration through 
bio logically  equalitarian principles. All creation, a l l  beings are 
Buddhas and they provide " in tr in s ic  enlightenment" or 1 Hons ho". (Cook 
1978:3) Japan's thirteenth-century Zen Master Dogen explains that the 
grass, the forest and so fo rth , are the mind, the body of the Buddha 
way. Nature then is the ultimate r e a l i ty  as one attains enlightenment 
by making the mind of grass one's own mind. I t  is the rocks and trees 
who preach the Pharma or Truth according to Dogen.(Cook 1978:115-125)
The Buddha is recognized best in "the forms of the mountains and the 
sounds of the valley streams." (Cook 1978:112)
Furthermore, in the primal interpretations of the three great 
monotheistic trad itions of Judeaism, C hris tian ity , and Islam, there are 
specific cosmological doctrines and mythic hierophanies which bear 
strik ing  s im ila r it ie s  to the preceding primal c ita tions . These 
trad it io n s , however, deserve closer scrutiny in a la t te r  work which 
cannot adequately be presented herein because complex ambiguities are 
associated with these trad itions and th e ir  anthropocentric influences.
Will-of-the-Land vs. Meta-reductionary rationalism
We can, however, observe in a l l  of the cosmologies presented 
herein, a contradistinction with DeCarte's meta-reductionary philosophy 
of rationalism. Moreover, the primal cosmologies acknowledge that w i l l  
is most potently discovered in the wild or wilderness as manifesting the
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w il l -o f - th e - la n d . This primial recognition of w il l  holds no dichotomy 
between the natural is of naturata. When, for example, the Lakota, Sword 
explains that "we do not see the real earth and rock but only th e ir  
tonwampi [which is th e ir  form or material manifestation]", he is 
expressing understanding of deeper, underlying Principle. The form — 
earth, rock or tree — is perceived m ateria lly  but i t  is also id en tif ied  
with motive force or underlying Princip le . This is the natural is of 
naturata hierophany where d istinction is made without separation. This 
ecological hierophany is pervasive in primal worldviews where the people 
have a re lational contact with the w i l l -o f - th e - la n d . When the 
natural is of naturata hierophany is vio lated, then principal Principle  
are separated. This act is a profanation. For example, in the 
Finno-Ugric reverance fo r  a tree soul or s p ir i t  - -  o r t ,  the people 
recognize that the ort may be disturbed when improper behavior is 
exercised in its  presence (c f .  Chapter I I I ) .  Likewise when the land 
becomes degeneratedly domesticated — controlled and ordered as in 
c iv i l iz a t io n  (c f .  Note 1, Chapter I )  — then i t  surrenders i ts  free w i l l  
and the w i l l - fo rc e  characteristic  to the natural is of naturata 
hierophany diminishes. Thus, i t  is extremely d i f f i c u l t  to encounter the 
"soul-mood" in c iv i l iz e d  settings. I t  is fo r this reason that primal 
peoples journeyed away from th e ir  habitations to sacred groves, 
mountains, etc. for religious quest. The wilderness requires of humans 
an acknowledgement of the sacred through the ecological hierophany - -  
the natural is of naturata. In such cases, one cannot escape the re a l i ty  
of wildness and w il l - fo rc e  as underlying Principle characteristic  to the 
material agent-principals of wilderness which together generate the
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w ill-o f-th e - la n d  cosmology that is born from worshipping on the heath, 
moor, or in the grove.
Rationalism and C iv il iza t io n
As c iv i l iz a t io n  (c f .  Chaper I )  overcame primal culture and society 
— subjugating w il l  to human desire or explemlifying the practice of 
human chauvinism — the human species made a grave error in shifting its  
relational ethos with the earth to a rationalized anthropocentricism. 
Carried away with a narc iss is tic  sense of consciousness which character­
izes rationalism, imperial re lig ion subdued the primal perspective. 
Although b u i l t  to recreate and stimulate the sublime awe and thereby 
emulate the natural is of naturata inherent to wild settings, the 
churches, cathedrals and temples are within the ordered, domestic 
control of c iv i l i z a t io n . (3) As a re su lt ,  imperial re lig ion fosters 
rationalism and its  concept of w il l  in opposition to realism and its  
re a l i ty  of wi11. The product of this practice is the domestication and 
degeneration of the w i l l  within the human species i t s e l f .  Subsequently, 
humans have lost contact with the w il l -o f-th e - la n d  which has denigrated 
into a restric ted sense, that is ,  a concept of w i l l  where only humans 
can engage in mental acts of ra t io n a li ty .  Proper respect fo r realism 
and genuine human ra t io n a li ty  are thereby lo st. How is this so?
The anthropocentricism characteristic  to rationalized w i l l  denies 
the re a l i ty  inherent to the w il l -o f-th e - la n d  cosmology. Thus, a rock or 
a tree or even another "higher" animal cannot be a possesser of w i l l . 
Rationalism, moreover, grounds w il l  in desire and in ten tio n a lity . I t  is 
associated with human longings for power and immortality. In
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rationalism, the concept of w il l  emerges from an escapest fantasy where 
humans are above and apart from the earth. In this conception, there is 
a dictohomizing and separation of the ecological hierophany, hence in 
this rationalism, Principle is most esteemed and alledged to elude or 
exist without principa l. Through this ra tio n a liza t io n , principal become 
profane while Principle is elevated to fantasy, free of realism. This 
delusion of rationalism is postulated from human desires to 
super-transcend l i f e  into immortal s e lf  which is non-reconcilable with 
the earthly processes of l i f e  and death characterized by the natural is  
of naturata hierophany and the w il l -o f-th e -la n d  cosmology. Hence, 
rationalism promotes a fantasy world of promise in the nether regions of 
heaven where the ego-self reigns supreme eterna lly . I t  in e ffec t denies 
death because of the fear of losing personal id en tity  in the face of 
"Great Mysterious."
Rationalism, therefore, promotes a "concept of wi11" which is 
re a l is t ic a l ly  narcissism and human chauvinism in ethical practice. 
Moreover, the principle of u t i l i t y ,  as espoused in u t i l i ta r ia n is m ,  
emerges as the dominant ethic by which humans should re late  with 
non-humans - -  whether they be other animals, plants, or the physical 
earth, i t s e l f .  The maximization of u t i l i t y ,  that is ,  the production of 
the greatest amount of pleasure or happiness for humans in the world at 
large, is then the ethical positive of rationalism. This ethos leads to 
the excessive projection of human values onto nature. A degenerate 
human w il l  resonating with the desire fo r  management is produced to 
argue that the wilderness is diabolical and evil so as to nurture 
rationalism and anthropocentric desires. Hence, rationalism is a
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will-to-power notion of meta-reductionism where the logic is to make an 
ememy of the other - -  nature in this case — and then dominate or manage 
i t  so as to project se lf  upon i t .  The result is the death of the other. 
Moreover, the logic of this metaTreductionism was presented in Chapter 
IV where the nominalization of "sacred power", the w i l l -o f - th e - la n d , 
into an abstract individual en tity  (de ity , or dragon as in the case of 
Loch Ness) robs the principal of its  power. Power, then, without a home 
or agent manifestation is appropriated by a human position of power —
i . e . ,  authority; in the form of the priesthood, hence giving birth  to 
human chauvinism. Secular authority s im ilarly  is the result of 
nominalism identify ing and concentrating the social power of the group 
into p o lit ic a l position, and thus into social hierarchy and class 
structure. Thus, rationalism k i l ls  the re lational connections between 
the re a l i ty  of w ill  which is the wildness in nature (including the 
human). I t  produces an ethos where the one species is "chosen" and is 
to be served a t the expense of the many other species. This ethos is 
then an anthropocentric meta-reductionism where w i l l - fo rc e  - -  
motive-force - -  is available only for the u t i l i t y  of the "chosen," - -  
the human, the one species which worships i t s e l f .
The philosophy of rationalism postulates that w il l  is one of the 
two rational fa c u lit ie s  of the human soul. Other animals are said to be 
to ta l ly  sensory motivated and devoid of the a b i l i t y  to choose. The 
A ris to t i l ia n  conception of potential bears this claim out with the 
notion that only the human in te l le c t  can be conscious of wi11ing. In 
this conception, w i l l  has become the ju s t i f ic a t io n  of reason and subject 
only to the human mind. Philosophers of rationalism further inform us
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that true choice exists only in rational beings which is fo r  them, 
solely the province of the human species. In this perception, the land 
can have no wi11, no sense of w i l l - fo rc e ; furthermore, even the other 
"higher" animals are incapable of wi11, because humans seek to be 
god-like. The human species has thus defined i t s e l f  into a niche of 
separation where i t  is no longer natural l ik e  other animals nor yet 
supernatural as a god. This disruption epitomizes a categoreal mistake 
of humans separate and outside of wildness and free from the laws of 
nature that characterize the natural is of naturata ecological hierophany 
and w il l -o f -th e - la n d  cosmology.
EPILOGUE: Continuing the Will-of-the-Land Cosmology
With these f ive  chapters, we have only begun to factor out the 
Will-of-the-Land cosmology and many questions remain concerning w ill  
(wild) and ness in conceptual relationship. Furthermore, what are the 
values characteristic  to wilderness solitude? In order to address these 
conceptual needs, I intend to continue this work with several 
forthcoming chapters:
V I. Wilderness of Will & Personal Id en tity . This chapter w ill  
include a further explanation of wilderness w i l l .  I t  w i l l  also 
formulate a relational basis fo r  the se lf  in personal iden tity  with 
ecosystems, the planet and the cosmos concordant with the 
Will-of-the-Land cosmology.
V I I .  Nature-Ness & the Norse Gods. This chapter w i l l  further  
examine the ecological heirophany, the natural is of naturata, while 
presenting the primary way the Norse Gods were understood by the Norse 
people. In addition i t  w i l l  continue the personal iden tity  and 
wilderness relationship as i t  pertains to s p ir i t  and soul.
V I I I .  Celtic  Fairies & the Feral Condition — S p ir i t  and soul in 
wildness context w i l l  be the central point of explication in this  
chapter. I t  w i l l ,  likewise, provide a more primary way of viewing 
f a i r ie s ,  s p ir its  and souls which upholds the original sense of Nature 
Awe.
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IX. Soul-Mood & Wildness Atonement — As a summary chapter, this  
explication w i l l  focus upon the way in which the "soul-mood" quickens 
our person. As a resu lt , i t  intends to factor out the reckonings of 
wilderness solitude, i ts  psychological experience and ethical values.
Consequently, these f i r s t  f ive  chapters which compose this thesis 
should be accepted e x p l ic i t ly  on th e ir  own merits and with recognition 
of future elaboration forthcoming. The end product w ill  be a monograph 
which explicates a Will-of-the-Land cosmology.
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PROLOGUE: The Question of Wilderness Solitude
(1)Mr. Fred Wolf was the D is tr ic t  Manager responsible fo r this  
statement. He was, at that time, administratively responsible for the 
Rawlins D is tr ic t  O ffice , BLM - -  USDI.
(2)Promoting the "Sagebrush Rebellion" - -  a move to remove 
federally  held public lands into private ownership, — Mr. Mon Tiegan 
was responsible for this statement.
(3)These Romantic and Transcendental movements and th e ir  call for  
wilderness preservation is well documented in Huth 1972 and Nash 1982. 
The Romantic period constitutes something of a revolution from 
trad itiona l u t i l l i t a r ia n  values and is founded upon an inspiration of 
place. In Europe where the Romantic movement began as a poetic and 
philosophic expression, Edmund Burke's A Philosophical Inquiry into the 
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) stands out 
prominently. Burke's French counterpart Jean Jacques Rousseau 
(1712-1778) provides, perhaps the best articu la tio n  of this movement.
(c f his Social Contract and the Reveries of the Solitary  Walker, both of 
which are characterized by skepticism and criticisms of the Western 
c iv i l iz a t io n  which he regarded as a sad deviation from the natural 
conditions of existence.) Further articu la tin g  this movement are the 
poetic works of William Blake (1757-1827), Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
(1772-1834) and William Wordsworth (1770-1850), among others who 
prominently expressed a Romantic Naturism (c f .  Bernbaum 1948). In 
America, the Romantic movement assumed a transcendental character 
positing the immanance of the divine in the f in i t e  existence of nature, 
thereby tending towards pantheism — e .g . ,  Ralph Waldo Emerson's 
"Nature", "oversoul", "The Transcendentalist." This doctrine was 
id e a l is t ic  and in tu it iv e  and its  ethics embraced idealism, indiv idual­
ism, mysticism, reformism, and optimism regarding human nature. I t  was 
broadly mystical and Unitarian in its  fundamental religious concept­
ual iza tion .
(4)The Federal Land Management Agencies make no reference to any of 
the Romantic and Transcendental doctrines in developing th e ir  c r i te r ia  
fo r  assessing wilderness character. Yet, wilderness historians Huth 
1972 and Nash 1982, as well as others, c learly  t ie  the precedent fo r  
wilderness preservation and our cultural thoughts about wilderness 
character into these movements. Acknowledged in note (3) both Movements 
posit a fundamentally religious ethos towards wild nature. In fa i l in g  
to factor these values into wilderness review c r i te r ia ,  the Agencies are 
guilty  of serious neglect of the cultural ethos which the 1964 
Wilderness Act was founded upon.
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(5)0nly the Federal Agencies w ill  be discussed with regard to the ir  
wilderness solitude assessment c r i te r ia .  State Agencies have generally 
followed th e ir  Federal counterparts in conducting wilderness reviews. 
They, therefore, have very l i t t l e  to o ffe r  in original ideals and 
c r i te r ia  fo r these endeavors.
(6)From this conclusion, i t  may not immediately appear as true that 
the N.P.S. and the F.& W.S. used a laissez fa ire  approach to wilderness 
review. In fa i l in g  to conceptualize other requisite  wilderness 
c r i te r ia ,  both agencies have fa ile d  to respect Section 2 (c )(a )  of the 
1964 Wilderness Act, whereby wilderness areas are defined as places 
having “outstanding opportunities for solitude or a prim itive and 
unconfined type of recreation." These wilderness opportunities are 
central to the "wilderness experience" which is a fundamental mandate of 
the Law. In ignoring these "opportunities" and basing evaluation 
to ta l ly  upon factors of size and naturalness, the respective agencies 
are debasing both the Law and the cultural mandate for the wilderness 
concept i t s e l f .  This accusation should not be seen as a basis for  
concluding that solitude or prim itive unconfined recreational 
opportunities might not be inherent in a l l  wildlands, that such 
wildlands in tr in s ic a l ly  possess such opportunities should properly be 
recognized as a given, however, in qualifying areas for wilderness 
designation, i t  is essential that we understand the basis - -  essential 
features and a ttributes — which characterize these experiential states.
( 7 ) I t  should be acknowledged that the RARE I I  process was 
invalidated by the decision in California v. Bergland which was affirmed 
almost en tire ly  upon appeal in the Ninth C ircu it Court of Appeals 
(Opinion of Oct. 22, 1982). The Appeals Court invalidated RARE I I  
primarily because i t  fa i le d  to f u l f i l l  provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), spec if ica lly  Section 4332 (42 U.S.C. 
1976):
. . .  a l l  agencies of the Federal Government shall - -
(A) U t i l iz e  a systematic, in terd isc ip linary  approach which w i l l  
insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the 
environmental design arts in planning and in decision-making which may 
have an impact on man's environment.
(B) Iden tify  and develop methods and procedures, in consultation 
with the Council on Environmental quality  established by T i t le  I I  of 
th is Act, which w i l l  insure that presently unquantified environmental 
amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in 
decision-making along with economic and technical considerations;
(F) Recognize the world wide and long-range character of 
environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of 
the United States, lend appropriate support to in i t ia t iv e s ,  resolutions,
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and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in 
anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality  of mankind's world 
environment;
(6) Make available to states, counties, m unicipalities, 
in s t itu t io n s , and individuals, advice and information useful in 
restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality  of the environment.
The Appeals Court also cites provisions of the Forest Planning Act 
[36 C.F.R. §219.1(b ), §219.13(c)(1) & (6 ) ]  as commanding attention to 
wilderness attributes and values,in the Forest Planning Process. 
Furthermore, the decision spec ifica lly  cites the WARS process as fau lty  
and inadequate.
82
END NOTES
CHAPTER I ,  NATURE AWE: C e ltic  Views o f Wildness
(l)Human chauvinism and i ts  arrogant b e lie f  in the in tr in s ic  value 
of c iv i l iz a t io n  is characterized by the conditions of anthropocentri­
cism and homocentricism. The morality of these perspectives is 
comprised of u t i l i t a r ia n  and teleological ethics where a ll  of wild 
nature is subsumed into the human chauvinistic category of natural 
resources. This position serves to deny wild others th e ir  in tr in s ic  
value. Moreover, u t i l i t a r ia n  and teleological ethics generate a mora­
l i t y  whereby a ll  of wild nature is measured by i ts  a b i l i ty  to service 
human u t i l i t y  - -  i . e . ,  the maximization of human pleasure and hap.- 
piness. Successional stages of this narcissistic  value structure  
produce the basis for social hierarchy in relagating selected humans 
— including both classes and entire  cultures — to non-egalitarian  
provinces of human society. Thus, an under privileged class or th ird  
world nation (culture) emerges as a "natural resource" for the social 
e l i t e  or bourgeoisie and upper classes. Hence, that which dominates 
and enslaves wild nature as natural resources, and that which produces 
social hierarchy and human resources — humans as resources - -  are 
both born of the same ethical structure which is i t s e l f  the ethos of 
anthropocentricism and homocentricism.
The chauvinism or m ili tan t narcissism of both anthropocentricism 
and homocentricism is borne out with a thorough etymological analysis. 
Anthropocentricism is a compound of the Greek words for man and center. 
Hence, anthropocentricism is "centring in man; regarding man as the 
central fact of the universe, to which a l l  surrounding facts have 
reference." [OED 1971: 90(360) & 91 (361) c f .  Weekley 1967:55]
Anthropocentricism is thus "A point of view which regards man as of 
central importance in the universe." (Winnick 1970:28) In i ts  l i t e r a l  
centering in man positive , the concept is "used in connection with 
extreme humanism, viewing the world in terms only of human experience." 
(Fern in Runes 1960:13) This perspective has been philosophically a r t i ­
culated as anthroposophy -  i . e . ,  "An occult system claiming that the key 
to wisdom and to an understanding of the universe l ies  in man himself. 
The original Greek coinage s ignified 'wisdom about man'. I t  is now 
applied to the philosophically eclectic  teaching of Rudolf Steiner 
(1861-1925), who believed that cultivation of man's evolving sp ir itu a l  
perceptions was the most important task facing humanity." (Flew 
1984:15) Hence, anthropocentricism is a condition which considers man 
to be the most s ign ificant en tity  of the universe and within its  
perspective, the world is both interpreted and regarded in terms of 
human values and experiences. A lbe it ,  the anthroposophy positive may 
permit the development of an enlightened insight from the in te r io r  
dimension of wilderness solitude (c f .  Chapter I I )  and promote subsequent 
sacred-ethical values derivative from the wild "soul-mood" experience, 
i t  however becomes i t s e l f  a profanation of the wild values charac­
t e r is t ic  of Nature through its  connection with c iv i l iz a t io n  and the pro­
motion of baseless human desires and interests at the needless expense 
of wildness.
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The analysis of c iv i l iz a t io n  and i ts  in tr in s ic  value further  
c la r i f ie s  this position on anthroposophy. C iv il iza t io n  is a compound 
of c iv i l i z e  and action. [OED 1971:422 (448)] C iv i l iz e  is derivative  
from the Latin C iv il is which means "of or pertaining to c it izens ,  
th e ir  private rights, e tc . ,  hence re lating to the body of citizens and 
th e ir  commonwealth." [OED 1971: 422 (446-447)] Furthermore, c iv i l  is 
derives from the Latin c iv i1 and to c iv i l i z e  which is "to make c i v i l ,  to 
bring out of a state of barbarism, to instruct in the arts of l i f e ,  and 
thus elevate in the scale of humanity; to enlighten, to re fine , polish,"  
as well as to domesticate or tame wild animals. In addition, c iv i l i z e  
means "to make ' c i v i l '  or moral, to subject to the laws of c iv i l  or 
social propriety." [OED 1971 422(448)]. The question is ,  who's values 
and morals establish social propriety? The references to barbarism and 
wild animals provide clues for answering th is  question. Barbarism is a 
reference to barbarians. Barbarian derives from "bable bable," etynolo- 
g ica lly  meaning "A foreigner, one whose language and customs d i f fe r  from 
the speaker's." H is to r ic a lly ,  th is term has been applied to "One liv in g  
outside the pale of the Roman empire and i ts  c iv i l iz a t io n ,  applied espe­
c ia l ly  to the northern nations who over threw them." I t  also applies to 
one who is  not Greek and one who is outside the pale of C hris tian ity  
[OED 1971:166 (663)] Barbarism is the valuative diminution given to 
those who hold a contradictory ethos - -  or with opposing sacred and 
ethical More's and trad it io n s . Those of a barbarous positive are thus 
those who are foreign and those who do not conform to the control and 
domination of the Greco-Roman c iv i l iz a t io n .  Hence barbarians are wild. 
Greco-Roman c iv i l iz a t io n  required that such cultures conform and submit 
to th e ir  values. This practice is a fundamental value in tr in s ic  to the 
notion of c iv i l iz a t io n  in opposition to wilderness. In the compound 
c iv i l iz a t io n ,  the su ffix  -action is used forms nouns of action from 
Latin partic ip les . Thus, c iv i l iz a t io n  is the act of c iv i l iz in g  or 
l iv in g  in a c iv i l ize d  state or condition. I t  is ,  therefore, the 
rationale for domesticating, dominating and controlling others. I t  also 
posits a view to order the w i l l  of another to one's chosen values, that 
is ,  for example, to domesticate a wild animal. Moreover, th is practice 
is the diminution of the wild animal's s e l f - w i l l ,  i ts  very wildness is 
reduced in favor of the values of the c iv i l i z e r .  As a result the animal 
loses i ts  vo lit ion  and i ts  very motive force. Such actions apply to 
humans as w e ll, the fundamental conditions of c iv i l iz a t io n  includes 
"internal social hierarchies, specia lization, c it ie s  and large 
populations ...."  (Winnick 1970: 117) Herein, the c ity -s ta te  has an 
enormous importance in the maintenance of c iv i l iz a t io n .  A c ity -s ta te  is 
"An autonomous state , consisting of a c ity  and its  outskirts . Usually 
there is a well-defined distinction between a peasant and a bourgeois 
class, as in Phoenecia or Greece." (Winnick 1970: 117) Consequently, 
c ity -s ta tes  are not equalitarian societies and th e ir  in tr in s ic  ethical 
structure is focused upon diminishing wildness in favor of order and 
control as defined by social hierarchy. Values are as a result u t i l i ­
ta rian  and teleological in th e ir  maximization of the e l i te s '  pleasure
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and happiness. This combination with anthropocentricism generates an 
ethos which posits others as resources - i . e . ,  human chauvinism or the 
m ilitan t narcissism re fle c t ive  of mankind as the central measure of the 
universe — an absolved en tity  unto i t s e l f  in transcendental d iv in ity .  
The concept of homocentricism further advances a false dichotomy between 
man and nature. In i ts  usage, homocentricism assumes a prima facie  
arrogance. The term homocentric is a compound of the Greek words for 
same and center, hence having the same center or likeness. [OED 1971: 
1323(355)] The confusion characteristic  to th is  term is i ts  anthropolo­
gical significance as derived from the Latin word meaning man. This 
condition is philosophically homological, that is ,  in English's 
borrowing of homo from both Greek and Latin , the term homocentricism is 
compounded with a structural correspondence which confuses its  usage.
For example, in English usage we commonly apply homocentricism to 
situations where we actually  mean anthropocentricism. This homological 
error produces the arrogance of homocentricism, which is the prima facie  
conclusion of human chauvinism. Moreover, the anthropocentric con­
sideration of man as the most s ignificant en tity  of the universe and 
that a l l  experiences must be interpreted and regarded in human valuation 
schemes, results in the a p r io ri decision that we consider only other 
selected members of the human species who are l ik e  us, ergo we become 
homocentric, that is ,  concerned only with our same kind and thus imper­
vious to the in tr in s ic  values of others, part icu la r ly  the wild which 
threatens our centricism.
For further discussions of these topics see Bookchin 1982,
Ehrenfeld 1981, Roylston 1982, and Shepard 1982.
(2)The basis for cap ita liz ing  "Nature Awe" is grounded in the 
natural is of natura -  i . e . ,  the of nature of nature. Contrary to 
pantheism where a l l  is conceived to be of God, Nature Awe cosmology is 
a complex ideology where the natural is of natura represents principal 
in Logos with Principle — i . e . ,  agent-form as manifest from motive 
force in h o lis t ic  harmony, as in the yin -  yang conception of Taoism, 
(c f .  Chapter IV, "Wildness in P rinc ip le").
(3)Much f ic t io n  has been proposed concerning C eltic  Druidism. The 
megalithic monuments of Stonehenge and an Avebury have, for example, 
been attributed to the Celts, (c f .  MacBain 1917) Furthermore, i t  has 
been posited that the Druids practiced blood sacrif ices . This 
hypothesis is ,  however, a f ic t io n  born of Christian narcissism, 
megalithic monuments such as Stonehenge and Avebury pre-date the Celts 
and th e ir  arriva l in the B rit ish  Is les . The megalithic peoples who 
b u il t  these monuments may have practiced blood sacrif ice  but there is 
in su ff ic ien t evidence to conclude that the Celts conducted such prac­
t ic e s . The Celts did, in fa c t ,  take these sites over for predicting  
seasonal periodicity  related to agricultural practices, but there is
no substantative evidence supporting Druidic blood sacrif ice . In using
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these s ite s , the Celts found the Megalithic cairns and barrows very 
suitable for storing the cremated remains of th e ir  dead. Urns were thus 
deposited in these earthen structures and i t  is most probably this prac­
t ic e  and the population control measure of in fan tic ide which lead to the 
f ic t io n  of Druidic blood sacrifices, (c f .  Markale 1978 and Cunliffe  
1979)
(4)That the construction of man-made temples and other human struc­
tures profane a sacred s ite  is a point of some contention. In 
addressing th is  contention, we should f i r s t  recognize that the Nature 
Awe trad it io n  was and is fundamentally a venevation of the natural is
of natura (c f .  Chapter IV) and hence a trad it io n  which acknowledged 
the w il l -o f-th e - la n d  over and above the will-of-man (c f .  Chapter I I I ) .  
Construction of temples, cathedrals, and other human a r t i f ic e s  in 
wilderness sanctuaries results in a controlling and ordering of the 
sacred w i l l -o f - th e  land. This practice is in ten tionally  a means for 
f u l f i l l i n g  the desires of human pleasure and happiness. The structues 
in h ib it  natural ecological processes, thereby reducing the sacred 
actions and presences of both principal and Principle (c f .  Chapter 
IV ) .  The result is a reduced effiacy of s ite  and a diminished w i l l -  
of-the-land . Despite the fact that these structures were often b u ilt  
to emulate the natural features (c f .  Catheral design) which evoked the 
"soul-mood," they excluded the majority of wild agents which are 
essential to the w il1 -of-the-land condition. Hence the sites became 
impotent of wildness in both principal and Principle; they came to 
serve only human u t i l i t y  — the maaximization of human pleasure and 
happiness — but th is  human desire of convience put an end to the 
Nature Awe religious trad itions of empathy with the w il l -o f-th e - la n d  
and wildness atonement.
( 5 ) I t  has been the primary purpose of this a r t ic le  to refute Nash's 
contention that no Old World people appreciated wilderness. In so 
doing, I may have over-emphasized the "positive" aspects of Nature Awe 
and its  near romantic appearing veneration of wilderness. Of course, 
such a romantic interpretation would be a serious mis-construal of the 
Nature Awe tra d it io n . That the ancient Celts very much appreciated 
wildness is c learly  evident, however, they also found some aspects of 
nature frightening. MacCulloch (1948:15) states, " i t  should be noted 
that other beings, monstrous and harmful, dwelt in rivers or lakes, 
water-horses, water-bulls , and the l i k e . . . . "  The fear of some aspects 
of nature is a normal in fe r io r i ty  before the natural is and natura.
Fear does not, however, entail loathing, hating or dread which have 
been the standard interpretations of European conceptions of nature.
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CHAPTER I I .  THE EDGE OF WITHIN
Solitude in Origin and Meaning
(1) This discussion of Aval Ion has been largely drawn from my 
original "Nature Awe" a r t ic le  published Spring 1983, Vol. nine, No. 1, 
Western Wildlands, Missoula, Montana Forest and Conservation Station, 
School of Forestry, University of Montana.
(2) The following defin itions are provided for solitude:
I . SOLUS
A. The state of being so lita ry : a so lita ry  l i f e ,
lonely l i f e  (Partridge 1958: 640) - -  e .g . ,  "The 
misanthrope enjoys his solitude" (Stein 1967).
1. "The state of being or l iv in g  alone; loneliness, 
seclusion, solitariness (of persons)" (OED 1971: 
2913;404).
2. "The state of being without opportunity fo r social 
intercourse; seclusion from society; lonely 
condition" (Funk 1963:2316).
3. "Remote from others; isolation" (Morris 1973: 
1229-1230).
4. Other distinctions or meanings:
a. time alone (without companions)
b. loneliness
c. seclusion
d. solitariness
e. remoteness from others
f .  isolation
g. soliloquy and "stopping the internal dialogue"
h. quest fo r being, personal identity  and 
defin it ion
i .  cloistered condition: sensory deprivation - -  
e .g . ,  alone in a closet
j .  mindfulness — introspective consciousness 
k. solitudinarian - -  a recluse or hermit
1. solo
m. development of freedom and independence - -
i . e . ,  se lf-re liance  and self-dependence 
n. autonomy — development of adequate
se lf-respo ns ib il ity  and adequate se lf-d irec tion  
— together with independence of social 
influences.
B. Vacuum domiciliurn - -  the notion that a place is 
desolate without permanent human habitation or 
c iv i l iz a t io n  — hence, loneliness (of places in 
human u t i l i t a r ia n  valuation); "remoteness from 
habitations; absence of l i f e  or s t ir "  (e .g . ,  in a
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desert) (Webster 1970: 294); c f .  OED 1971: 2913; 
404). Furthermore, this condition is fundamentally 
anthropocentric focusing upon people and the ir  
places of habitation. I t  favors the in tr in s ic  value 
of c iv i l iz a t io n  over that of wilderness.
I I .  COSMOLOGICAL THEMES of Solitude
A. In te r io r  - -  the idea of space.
A lonely unfrequented, or uninhabitated place (a 
solitude or solitudes). Solitude (or solitudes) is 
used metyonymically, that is as a figure of speech 
where the name of one thing is given another based- 
upon associated or share a ttr ibu tes . Hence, the 
a ttr ib u te  solitude is used to define wilderness and, 
conversely, dictionaries w ill  define solitude as 
wilderness. For example,
1. "A place that is deserted or lonely; a desert" 
(Funk 1963: 2316);
2. "A so lita ry  or lonely place, as a desert or 
wilderness" (Webster 1970: 284);
3. "Wilderness; lonely place, desert" (C lifton  
1923: 1191);
4. "A seeluded’ place" (Morris 1973: 1229-1230).
5. Other d istinctions, meanings and values:
a. An emphasis upon the physical environment
1. presence of wildness
2. presence of w i ld l i fe
3. presence of physical forces
(e .g . ,  the negative ions associated 
with a w a te r fa l l ,  or following a 
thunderstorm, e tc .)
b. Relationship with human values of 
wilderness
1. environmental screening for seclusion
2. environmental spaciousness for
loneliness, soul-mood, etc. (human 
sensory perceptions and values of 
landscapes).
3. a place for finding the sp ir itu a l  
in te r io r  — i . e . ,  go to the in te r io r  
to find the in te r io r .
c. Creature solitude i . e . ,  the right and 
opportunity for other animals — w i ld l i f e ,  
and landscapes — wildlands - -  to be alone, 
undisturbed, untrammeled and free from 
human influence, presence, domination and 
interference.
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B. The VOID: "A complete absence or lack" (OED 1971:
2913, 404); "dearth" (Webster 1970: 284). The void 
is contingent upon emergent w i l l .  Associations with 
the void include:
1. in want or need
2. to be defic ien t or missing
3. to be short or have need of something
4. to stand in need of: suffer from the absence
of deficiency of
5. inattention to present surroundings or 
occurrences
6. the scarcity that makes dear
7. an inadequate supply
8. synonymous with solitude in this void sense are 
lack, want, need, require: i . e . ,  to be without 
something essential or greatly desired. Luck 
can imply e ither an absence or a shortage in 
supply, want adds to lack the notion of urgency 
in needing or desiring; need stresses urgent 
necessity more than absence or shortage, require 
often interchangeable with need, may heighten 
the implication of urgent necessity to the point 
of suggesting an imperativeness of needing or 
desiring.
9. intimidation from elemental wildness, including
a. threat, fear
b. estrangement
c. sombriety and gloom
d. desolation
10. serenity with wildness
a. timelessness
b. silence
c * SOLE — "The fact of being sole or unique" (OED 
1971: 2913; 404). The condition of the sublime as 
founded upon sole - or -  unique features of the wild 
landscape which are characterized by th e ir :
1. being the only one
2. exclusive lim ited to one
3. specified individualness (un it or group)
4. single
5. exclusion of a l l  else
6. producing only one result
7. being without a l ik e  or equal; unequaled
8. very rare or uncommon; very unusal
9. strange; b izarre; weird
10. sublimity; awe-inspiring
11. wonderment over ra r i ty  or oddity, etc.
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12. esthetic contemplation (c f .  Eliade 1959:152)
13. emotional g ra t if ica t io n
14. majesty; majestic distinctiveness
D. "SOUL-MQOD" - -  a sp ir itu a l or sacred valuation of 
the wild. "Soul-mood" is based on the deepest Latin 
etymological derivation of solitude — i . e . ,  "sol" 
(would in the middle English) and "mood" (based on 
the Latin -tude s u f f ix ) .  The "soul-mood" is  
characteristic  of the sacred and religious devotion 
to and reverence fo r  the wild.
1. sacred in experience, a sense of the numinous
2. solemn as in religious observance - -  i . e . ,  
r i t u a l ,  ceremony and sacred r i t e  — e .g . ,  in 
wilderness sanctuaries, the occurrence of the 
guardian or vision quest among native Americans 
(the walk-about) Australian Aborigines, and in 
the nemetons of the Nature Awe religions of 
ancient C elts , Norse and other early  
Indo-Europeans.
3. Meditation (c f .  Eliade 1959: 153-4) which may be 
sou lfu l, re-creational and giving of solace.
4. Wildness atonement - -  i . e . ,  oneness with 
wildness. This may be contemplative of the 
numinous experience and of the natural is of 
naturata, the creative l i f e  force or s p ir i t  
pervasive to a l l  that is . There is also herein 
a re flection  upon the unknown, and upon the 
sacred relationship of p rinc ipa l, (form 
manifest) and Principle (motive force). Hence 
this "soul-mood" may be an intimacy with and 
re flection  upon "Great Mysterious" in the sense 
of empathy, atonement and ecstasy.
(3) Vacuum domicilium became "a standard Christian argument . . .  
with which to ju s t i fy  th e ir  (the Puritans) occupation of native lands.
In the words of John Cotton, one of the leading Puritan ministers,
"Where is a vacant place, there is l ib e r ty  fo r  the son of Adam or Noah 
to come and inhabit, though they neither buy i t ,  nor ask th e ir  leaves
  In a vacant s o i l ,  he that taketh possession of i t ,  and bestoweth
culture and husbandry upon i t ,  his r igh t i t  is .  And the ground of this  
is from the Grand Charter given to Adam and his posterity in Paradise, 
Genesis 1:28. Mutlip ly and replenish the earth, and subdue i t "  (Segal & 
Stinebeck 1977).
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(1)The reference to animate and inanimate nature should be 
recognized to be of modern orig in , primal peoples would not acknowledge 
these categories. Furthermore, what is "stationary nature?" In lieu  of 
the "new physics" (to ) which McBain did not have access, we can be sure 
today that there is no such thing as "stationary nature." (c f .  Capra 
1980, Tablot 1981, and Zukav 1980)
(2)The problems of the concept of c iv i l iz a t io n  are apparent in the 
discussion presented in note (1) Chapter I .  Use of culture as an 
alternative  has expression in Wendell Berry's The Unsettling of America: 
Culture & Agriculture (1970).
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(1 )In  presenting "Great Mysterious, the a r t ic le  "the" is 
deliberate ly  ommitted in order to avoid meta-reductionism. Should "the" 
be used, i t  would serve to the process of nominalizationism and 
subsequent nominalism of "Great Mysterious"; a condition which must be 
consciously avoided in order to be true to the cosmology, (c f .  Chapter 
IV ).
(2)Primal peoples, such as the Celts, do not acknowledge the 
categories of "animate" and "inamimate". Moreover, they perceive a l l  
that is to be "animate" in i ts  nature. Hence there is an understanding 
present in these world views which perceives w illfu lness and s e lf -w il le d  
positives as en tity  specific — i . e . ,  fundamental to the specific en tity  
in Principle.
(3)The cathedral has emerged as a tru ly  unique architectural 
product of northern Europe. The basis fo r i ts  uniqueness is the sacred 
grove which i t  emulates. Moreover, the columns of cathedrals appear as 
the trunks of mature trees and the arches in th e ir  curving peak simulate 
the interface between two trees. Furthermore, the stain glass motiffs  
appear in coloration to produce an e ffec t much lik e  sun-light upon a 
forest. One is inspired in a v irg in  mature forest to observe the 
shading and rays of l ig h t ,  and look through the trees to the heavens. 
Thiskind of forest produces a solemn, sublime e ffec t upon the ob server 
which is emulated in the vaulted ce iling  of cathedrals. I am sure many 
other connections can be drawn between the cathedral and the sacred 
grove, that those presented are su ff ic ie n t to acknowledge my point, is 
central to the fac t that the cathedral is a technological recreation of 
the sacred grove. Hence, in representing the sacred grove, the 
cathedral occupies the s ite  of the original grove and became profane 
(human technological) representation of agent-manifestation ( i . e . ,  
principal) and agent-of-form ( i . e . ,  Principle) or motive force as 
observed in the wildness of the sacred grove.
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